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Abstract 
The competitive dynamics literature has examined various characteristics of 
actions/response dyads (e.g., new product release, market entry, marketing campaigns) 
along with their antecedents and competitive outcomes. For the most part, the emphasis 
has been on objective and structural factors that influence the dynamics of competition. 
What is often overlooked is that organizations’ actions are a result of individual level 
perceptions and interpretations. To gain a more comprehensive understanding of 
competitive dynamics, I integrate micro and macro perspectives in the study of 
competition. By drawing from theories in managerial cognition, organizational attention, 
and behavioral strategy, I examine how mental structures of decision-makers (CEOs) can 
influence the way competitive moves by a rival are perceived, which in turn shapes the 
subsequent responses to those moves. The main mechanisms linking cognition to 
competitive decisions are rooted in the literature on organizational attention and the 
processes that explain how and why managers notice and act on some competitive moves 
and ignore others. 
I develop and test hypotheses that link managerial regulatory focus, perception of 
identity, and external/internal orientation to the likelihood and speed of response to 
competitive actions. I also examine how the salience of a competitive action within the 
industry can moderate these relationships. The Awareness-Motivation-Capability 
framework in competitive dynamics is used as a theoretical bridge between cognition and 
the nature of response to competitive moves by rivals. Using data from one industry, I 
test the proposed relationships and discuss the implications for research and management 
practice. The results show that while perceptions regarding identity and external/internal 
orientation influence the likelihood of response, regulatory focus seems to have no effect. 
The salience of the competitive attack also influenced likelihood of response and 
positively moderated the relationship between external/internal orientation and the 
likelihood of response. None of the hypotheses related to the speed of response dependent 
variable were supported.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Competition is a reality of life and is central to the field of strategy. For as long as we 
have limits on resources and opportunities, firms will have to compete and commit to 
actions that give them advantage over their rivals. Various streams of research in strategy 
have examined this phenomenon from unique angles but it is only the study of 
competitive dynamics that has focused on specific competitive actions and their effects 
on competitors, competitive advantage, and performance (Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 
2001). These competitive actions can take many forms including new product 
development, adding features to a current product or service, pricing strategies, marketing 
campaigns, or mergers/acquisitions. What is shared amongst these activities is that they 
are all aimed at gaining competitive advantage over rivals. Put differently, a firm will 
resort to competitive moves to gain a better position at the expense of another player 
within the field, industry, or group of competitors
1
 (Chen, 1996).  
A large body of work in the competitive dynamics literature looks at the nature and 
likelihood of response from firms that are impacted by a specific competitive action. If I 
act and initiate a competitive move against my rivals, what is the likelihood that they will 
respond, and if they do, what will that response look like? Generally speaking, the unit of 
analysis is often an action/response dyad and by definition, a firm’s strategy and position 
are always considered in comparison to its rival or group of close competitors (Chen & 
Miller, 2012). Competitive actions are examined with rivals and their possible 
response(s) in mind and responses are counter-attacks aimed at regaining a competitive 
                                                 
1
 Some scholars believe that a zero-sum approach to competition lacks an understanding of positive sum 
possibilities through cooperation and is therefore incomplete (e.g., Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997). A 
holistic view of competition will also include cooperation through which the size of the pie (benefits) 
increases for everyone (Nielsen, 1988). But even these scholars acknowledge that zero-sum approaches are 
part of reality and firms sometimes do need to achieve gains at the expense of their rivals. These two 
approaches seem complimentary as opposed to contradictory. In this study, my focus is mainly on the zero-
sum aspect of competition although this does not imply that the gains of one player need to be exactly the 
same as the losses incurred by another firm. 
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edge over rivals. This dyadic approach is a key element in the competitive dynamics 
literature. 
In addition to this critical aspect of competitive dynamics, it is also important to note two 
other foundational principles that have helped define and develop the field. The first 
principle is that human agency and decision-making matter and are consequential (Chen 
& Miller, 2012; Chen, Su, & Tsai, 2007; Rowe, Cannella Jr, Rankin, & Gorman, 2005). 
This is especially important for my research as it paves the way for discussions on how 
individual-level factors can impact the likelihood and nature of a firm’s actions in 
response to specific competitive stimuli. Without agency, this will be a baseless argument 
and a futile effort. The second principle, as initially discussed by Chen (1996), is the 
principle of competitive asymmetry. In its core, the principle indicates that two rivals will 
perceive a given competitive action or relationship in different ways (Chen & Miller, 
2012). This could be due to a number of factors such as a firm’s position in a wider 
competitive landscape, its internal organizational factors such as resources or structure, or 
individual level factors such as mental models and schemas. 
Research conducted on the psychology of rivalry (Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010) 
reaffirms the fact that not all rivals or competitive actions are viewed equally, and 
depending on which rival the action is coming from or its timing, the perceived 
significance and subsequent interpretations may be different. The important word here is 
“interpretation” which as I discuss is deeply rooted in a decision-maker’s cognition. In 
this dissertation, I examine how these interpretations shape the attentional pattern of top-
managers (CEOs) and in turn influence the characteristics of competitive response. 
Researchers have argued that organizations do not necessarily react to competitive moves 
by their rivals rationally or based on traditional economic reasoning (Yu, Engleman, & 
Van de Ven, 2005). In essence, this implies that goals other than the maximization of 
economic gains, and potentially different interpretations of what desired outcomes should 
be, influence competitive dynamics. This approach can supplement the current 
conventional thinking in the competitive dynamics literature and our understanding of the 
determinants of action/response dyads. 
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Although a number of recent and older articles have called for more attention to the role 
of perceptions and interpretations in shaping competitive actions/responses, a review of 
the literature clearly shows that the domain of competitive dynamics has largely focused 
on structural and observable market factors and the economic modeling of actions and 
reactions (Chen et al., 2007). It seems that scholars have mostly overlooked the 
opportunity to integrate micro and macro perspectives in approaching this subject matter 
(Chen & Miller, 2012). What organizations and their decision makers perceive, how they 
interpret events, and their reactions are all influenced by individual level factors and the 
structural elements within the organization (Hodgkinson, 1997a; Ocasio, 1997). Given 
this important argument, and the significance of human agency in competitive dynamics, 
it seems fitting to explore the role of decision-makers’ cognition in the competitive 
dynamics process. By drawing from theories in behavioral strategy (Powell, Lovallo, & 
Fox, 2011), managerial cognition (e.g., Kaplan, 2011; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Walsh, 
1995) and organizational attention (Ocasio, 1997, 2011), I attempt to view competitive 
dynamics in a better light and offer an alternative model which complements our current 
understanding of the issues. As Hambrick (2007) elegantly puts it, “if we want to 
understand why organizations do the things they do, or why they perform the way they 
do, we must consider the biases and dispositions of their most powerful actors-their top 
executives” (2007, p. 334). 
When a competitor initiates a competitive move with consequences for a focal 
organization, that organization can only respond if its decision-makers become aware of 
the action. It is a widely held belief that what gets noticed gets done (Hambrick, 1981; 
Ocasio, 1997), and no one can respond to an action that has not been detected at all. The 
act of noticing is an integral element in the concept of attention. Based on theoretical 
arguments rooted in the Carnegie School of thought, attention is a limited resource 
(Simon, 1947) and various environmental, structural, and individual level factors 
influence what a manager pays attention to and the quality of that attention. In the context 
of organizations, attention has been defined as “the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and 
focusing of time and effort by organizational decision-makers on both (a) issues: the 
available repertoire of categories for making sense of the environment; problems, 
opportunities and threats; and (b) answers: the available repertoire of action alternatives; 
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proposals, routines, projects, programs, and procedures” (Ocasio 1997, p. 189). There are 
two processes involved in how a decision maker’s focus of attention is determined. First 
is the bottom-up approach which deals with the characteristics of stimuli and what makes 
them stand out amongst a number of others. The second is the top-down approach which 
argues that goals, values, task demands and cognitive orientations (schemas) influence 
how attention is directed (Ocasio, 2011). In one of the few studies looking at cognition in 
competitive dynamics, Marcel, Barr, and Duhaime (2011) refer to similar processes as 
the cue and the processing propensity approaches in competitive dynamics. As I discuss 
and examine in this dissertation, these two perspectives are inter-related when discussing 
the links between cognition, attention, and competitive dynamics. 
It is evident from the definition of attention that encoding and interpreting are important 
aspects of the attention construct. In industries that experience fast-paced competition, 
firms face a complex and demanding environment and managers need to come up with 
interpretations for ambiguous information (Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993). Interpretation 
is a complex process and prior research has argued theoretically and examined 
empirically that when exposed to similar stimuli, decision-makers in different 
organizations will interpret issues differently (Daft & Weick, 1984; Thomas et al., 1993; 
Thomas, Shankster, & Mathieu, 1994). For example, two managers might look at a 
particular competitive move by a rival, with one interpreting it as an opportunity, while 
the other sees it as a potential threat. This is partly due to contextual factors that direct the 
flow of information, attention and subsequently, interpretation (Daft & Weick, 1984; 
Ocasio, 1997), but also the decision makers’ cognitive frames and knowledge structures 
(Porac & Thomas, 1994; Walsh, 1995).  
Many years have passed since Hambrick and Mason (1984) initially talked of a “gulf” 
between disciplines such as psychology and sociology and what we examine in strategic 
management. But with all the research that has been conducted to date, we can still do 
much more to incorporate managerial perceptions and cognition in the study of 
competitive behavior (Marcel et al., 2011). Given the fact that it is the managers who 
notice, interpret, and act on cues from the competitive environment, it is important to 
consider their cognition as the major factor influencing competitive dynamics. In addition 
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to attention to external stimuli, managers hold beliefs regarding the organization’s 
internal capabilities and resources, and these beliefs also influence if, how and when a 
manager will respond to external actions (Thomas et al., 1993).  
In an attempt to offer a new model for inter-organizational competitive behavior, I 
examine decision-makers’ specific cognitive orientations and their role in shaping 
attentional patterns. The response to a competitive action is influenced by a manager’s 
(i.e., CEO’s) interpretation of that action and his/her attention to it. When a competitive 
action unfolds, its size, relevance, and timing are only a few of the characteristics that 
determine if it can attract attention. This is consistent with the bottom-up approach in 
examining organizational attention and is examined quite extensively in the competitive 
dynamics literature. But a closer look will reveal that issues such as relevance and timing 
are not objective terms and one can assume that a host of individual and organizational 
level factors determine their subjective significance in the eyes of a decision-maker. 
These factors as discussed above are more in line with the top-down approach in attention 
and seem to be under-studied in the literature.  
How an organization is structured and the configuration of its communication channels 
influence what a decision-maker’s attention is guided towards, but in addition to this 
structural element emphasized strongly in the attention based view of the firm (ABV) 
(Ocasio, 1997), scholars have also acknowledged the importance of sensemaking (Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005; Yu et al., 2005) in shaping attentional patterns. Here, the 
unique emphasis on the influence of mental models and cognitive orientations in creating 
awareness and guiding attention adds valuable insight. Sensemaking is a “social 
construction process” meaning that various individuals interpret the cues that gain their 
attention, and these interpretations then become the reality that individuals face and use 
to form the basis of their attention, interpretation, and action (Yu et al., 2005). The role of 
mental models and schemas are highlighted in this process and are at the core of this 
study.  
In essence, the focus of this dissertation is to offer a fresh view on how responses to 
competitive actions unfold. More specifically, I look at the factors that shape the 
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characteristics of a response and the mechanisms that explain this relationship. As 
mentioned previously, the competitive dynamics literature has looked at a host of 
different objective criteria and circumstances that shape various aspects of a response. 
The models offered in these studies usually follow an economics-based rationale and the 
assumptions that accompany it. Based on arguments rooted in behavioral strategy (Powell 
et al., 2011), I offer an alternative model to supplement and add to this prevalent rationale 
(as shown in Figure 1-1). Although the current models do enrich our understanding of 
competitive dynamics, they offer only a partial picture. By incorporating the role of 
cognition in these models, a more comprehensive understanding can be gained which will 
help move the field forward and also help managers gain a better understanding of 
competition. In a general sense, my research question in this dissertation is: How do 
individual level cognitive factors such as mental models and schemas influence the way 
decision-makers respond to competitive actions by rivals? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to incorporate concepts from the literature on 
managerial cognition and organizational attention to explain why individuals react 
differently to similar competitive actions or react in a way that is difficult to explain 
using traditional economic reasoning. Although a handful of studies have looked at the 
role of cognition in competition, none have examined a comprehensive set of cognitive 
aspects and their link to the characteristics of a response. In the only empirical study to 
date, Marcel et al. (2011) have looked at managers’ perceptions about what actions 
influence organizational performance, and how these perceptions influence the response 
to competitive actions. Their study has made great contributions both in terms of research 
design and content to our understanding of cognition in competitive dynamics. Other 
scholars such as Kaplan (2008) and Eggers and Kaplan (2009) have examined the role of 
CEO cognition in adapting to important industry-wide technological changes. Although 
these studies provide useful insights on managerial cognition and adaptation, they do not 
address the role of cognition in competitive dynamics. As described briefly in this 
introduction, the study of competitive dynamics has unique principles that clearly set it 
apart from other events such as technological shocks.  
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In this dissertation, I examine how a specific set of managerial cognitive frames and 
orientations will impact their focus of attention and subsequent behavior in response to 
competitive moves by close rivals. I look at perceptions of organizational identity, 
promotion vs. prevention focus (regulatory focus), and external vs. internal orientation. 
Each of these cognitive frames or orientations has important implications for managerial 
decision-making, especially in the context of competitive dynamics. I examine identity as 
a concept that helps explain why managers put different degrees of emphasis on the 
various aspects of their business. Identity is a powerful tool in determining managers’ 
psychological ties to specific parts of their business (Livengood & Reger, 2010). 
Managers’ perceptions about the identity of their organizations and elements that define it 
can influence the way they understand and respond to competition.  
Internal and external focus is another cognitive orientation examined in this dissertation. 
It has been discussed in a number of studies in strategic management (e.g., Barnett, 2008) 
and it is an important concept in trying to explain managerial attention. Since attention is 
a central element in my theoretical arguments, this cognitive orientation deserves a 
central role in this study of competitive dynamics. Additionally, most studies have so far 
measured this inherently cognitive concept using very objective measurements such as 
investment in obtaining marketing data or in R&D. In this dissertation, I use methods that 
measure internal and external focus as cognitive orientations which will create a closer 
link between the concept and its measurement.  
Finally, promotion and prevention focus have been included in this study because of its 
role in shaping various aspects of attention and also the development of a set of possible 
responses after an individual has become aware of an external stimuli. Regulatory focus 
theory (Higgins, 1998; Higgins & Silberman, 1998) explains an important individual 
level orientation that can determine the pattern of a manager’s attention and also the 
availability of a certain set of responses in his/her mind. It is an important and widely 
studied concept in psychology that has rarely been viewed in the strategic decision 
making literature. Overall, using arguments developed from research on managerial and 
organizational cognition, I hypothesize that each of these cognitive phenomena will 
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influence whether decision-makers notice, pay attention to, and/or respond to competitive 
moves.  
In addition to the effects described above, another aspect of attention is extremely 
important in this context and merits further examination. Scholars (e.g., Vergne, 2012; 
Weick, 1995) have argued that the salience of a particular event has direct influence on 
how it is perceived and forms the basis of future mental models. In fact, decision makers 
tend to allocate their attention based on the relevance and salience of issues at hand 
(Ocasio, 1997; Rerup, 2009). The cognitive aspects mentioned in the previous paragraphs 
address the relevance question since what is deemed relevant is directly influenced by a 
decision maker’s mental frames and schemas. To address the issue of salience, I develop 
arguments and hypotheses that explain how the salience of an issue moderates the 
relationship between a manager’s cognitive orientations and his/her response to 
competitive moves. By incorporating both the relevance and salience aspects of attention 
in my arguments, I am in essence addressing the top-down and bottom-up aspects of 
attention as described by Ocasio (2011). Salience tends to be involved in bottom-up 
processes where the density and visibility of the target plays an important role in how 
attention is directed. Relevance and how I have linked it to managerial cognition tends to 
fall under top-down processes, since it is the mental frames and structures that determine 
the target of attention. This dissertation answers the call by Ocasio (2011) to address both 
processes in research on organizational attention. 
To test my hypotheses, I use data from one industry (mobile phone manufacturers 
competing in North America) and employ content analysis techniques introduced and 
used by a number of previous studies in the area of managerial cognition (e.g., Barr, 
1998; Kaplan, 2008; Kaplan, Murray, & Henderson, 2003; Marcel et al., 2011). 
Attention, mental structures and schemas, and interpretations are all cognitive processes 
which cannot be measured directly, and as a result, researchers have used behavior and 
written or verbal communication as indirect measurements of what goes on inside an 
individual’s (i.e., CEO) head (Barr, 1998; Cho & Hambrick, 2006). My data are collected 
from company reports, published interviews, industry publications, and major news 
sources which contain valuable information relevant to this study. Although there are a 
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number of shortcomings and inaccuracies associated with this approach, prior research 
has shown this to be an acceptable and effective method in measuring cognitive attributes 
(Kaplan, 2011). Unobtrusive measures are also particularly useful in collecting data when 
accessing individuals such as top level managers is extremely difficult (Webb & Weick, 
1979). 
The contributions of this study are manifold. Firstly, I am addressing an under-studied 
area in the competitive dynamics literature by addressing micro individual level factors 
that influence the characteristics of action/response dyads. Using the literatures on 
managerial cognition and attention, I develop a new model to explain the nature of 
response to competitive actions above and beyond what was previously known through 
traditional economic reasoning. Examining the more subjective factors involved in 
explaining action/reactions and their characteristics helps explain why a particular firm 
attacks a particular market or reacts to an attack on one of its markets more vigorously 
than others. This is also in line with Walsh’s (1995) call to move beyond simple studies 
on the content of knowledge structures and move to examine the link between cognition 
and behaviors that result in organizational outcomes and processes.  
Secondly, I incorporate both bottom-up and top-down processes in organizational 
attention by addressing the relevance and salience aspects of attention. Ocasio (2011) has 
asked for this to be an important consideration in research on organizational attention. 
My study design allowed me to test the interaction between the two processes and 
examine the implication of this interaction for the theory on attention. Very few studies 
have empirically tested the interaction between the bottom-up and top-down processes 
and hopefully, insights gained in this dissertation will contribute to our understanding of 
organizational attention.  
Thirdly, I am incorporating a research methodology which is only beginning to enter the 
competitive dynamics realm. I use methods prevalent in the behavioral strategy literature 
to capture the dispositions and cognitive orientations of CEOs. This provides valuable 
insights for future research in this body of knowledge and creates opportunities for us to 
explore alternative models that explain competition. And finally, my study is part of a 
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small but growing body of literature that has empirically tested the link between 
managerial cognition and competitive dynamics. Although there are a number of 
theoretical articles that have examined a set of cognitive phenomena, many of the 
proposed relationships have remained untested. By developing a theoretical model and 
testing its hypotheses, this study takes a step towards building a more comprehensive 
body of literature in this area. Figure 1-1 summarizes the study’s contributions. 
This study also has implications for managerial practice. It gives us a better 
understanding of how managers think and act. Once we know this, the knowledge can be 
used in hiring and promotion decisions so that individuals fit the profile needed for a 
competitive landscape. It also helps organizations conduct a more accurate analysis of 
rivals and predict behavior based on what they know about decision-makers at rival 
firms. The study also sheds light on the importance of organizational structures and 
routines that induce and activate certain cognitive orientations. By acknowledging their 
role, managers can design structures that reinforce desired cognitive orientations or alter 
those that impede proper thinking. 
This dissertation is structured in the following manner: After this introduction, I provide a 
comprehensive review of the literatures on competitive dynamics, managerial cognition, 
behavioral strategy and organizational attention. Through this literature review, I 
highlight the gaps in the literature and build a theoretical repertoire for my subsequent 
hypothesis development. In the third chapter, I offer arguments to build my hypotheses 
that link cognition and attention to competitive dynamics. In chapter four, I present my 
research design and an overview of my data sources and issues surrounding reliability 
and validity. Chapter five includes the results of my analysis and a detailed discussion is 
offered in chapter six. I conclude by offering suggestions for future research based on the 
findings of this dissertation. 
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Figure ‎1-1 Contributions of this study 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 
There is an abundance of both theoretical and empirical studies in the strategy literature 
linking environmental events to decisions and subsequent actions. But researchers are 
increasingly acknowledging that the economics notion of a direct link between 
environmental stimuli and organizational action and heterogeneity might not be as 
accurate as previously asserted (Powell et al., 2011). We are being reminded that in the 
fuzzy front end of decision making, cognitive structures significantly influence the 
framing of decisions and it is this framing that actually shapes subsequent choices and 
actions (Narayanan, Zane, & Kemmerer, 2011). In my quest to apply this line of thinking 
to the realm of competitive dynamics, I rely on theoretical foundations from a number of 
research streams. First, I review research on competitive dynamics to understand how this 
line of research has evolved over the years and where it stands today. My review revealed 
areas in the literature that warrant further inquiry. Second, I review the literature on 
behavioral strategy with a strong emphasis on managerial cognition and attention. This 
line of inquiry has the potential to address some of the gaps identified in the competitive 
dynamics literature. I also examine the upper echelons literature as it directly leads to 
gaps addressed in the behavioral strategy research program. Finally, I discuss the 
literature on three specific aspects of cognition that are used in this study (regulatory 
focus, perceptions of identity, and external/internal orientations) to predict the nature of a 
firm’s response to competitive moves by its rivals. 
 
2.1 Competitive Dynamics 
The study of competitive dynamics is concerned with how specific competitive actions 
and reactions affect competitors, competitive advantage and performance (Smith et al., 
2001). More specifically, this body of literature looks at how the characteristics of an 
action, an actor, or a responder determine the likelihood and speed of response, which 
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then translates into performance outcomes (Chen et al., 2007). Each of these elements 
have been the subject of studies over the years, with some focusing on the antecedents of 
competitive actions, others looking at the characteristics of the responder and others 
examining the link to performance. These competitive actions/responses usually take the 
form of new product development, new pricing scheme, an acquisition, or a change of 
geographic market (Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 2008; Porter, 1980). There are 
also nonmarket moves such as lawsuits which are increasingly used as competitive 
actions (Shaffer, Quasney, & Grimm, 2000). The literature is not unanimous in its view 
of who can be labeled a rival or competitor. For example, studies rooted in I/O economics 
(e.g., Porter, 1980) assume that firms within an industry are automatically competitors. 
Others have looked at firms within a strategic group as automatic rivals. In this study, I 
use the definition offered by Chen (1996) which defines a competitor as any firm that has 
the potential to capture a resource or opportunity that a focal firm would also like to 
acquire. It is clear from this definition that competitors do not necessarily have to be in 
the same industry or field and the only thing that connects them is the fact that they are 
interested in the same resources or opportunity.  
Although the competitive dynamics literature is comprehensive and quite diverse, it has 
to a large extent adhered to a set of four overarching principles that have helped define 
the field (Chen & Miller, 2012). Firstly, the unit of analysis is a single competitive move 
or more often an action/response dyad. Most studies either look at the specific objective 
organizational or contextual factors that predict an action or response (e.g., Ferrier, 2001; 
Ndofor, Sirmon, & He, 2011), or the characteristics of a particular competitive action and 
the likelihood and nature of a retaliatory response to that action (e.g., Chen & Miller, 
1994; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991). Speed, intensity, diversity, and likelihood 
of response to a competitive move are all classic dependent variables in this body of 
research. Secondly, relativity is an essential premise and a firm’s strategy and position in 
a market are always considered in comparison to its rival or group of competitors (Chen 
& Miller, 2012).  
The third principle, as initially discussed by Chen (1996) is the principle of competitive 
asymmetry. In its core, the principle indicates that two rivals perceive a given 
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competitive action or relationship in different ways. This could be due to a number of 
reasons including a firm’s position in a wider competitive landscape, its internal 
organizational factors such as resources or structure, or individual level factors such as 
mental models and prior experiences which have been rarely discussed in the literature 
(Chen et al., 2007). And finally, an important aspect that defines this stream of research 
in strategy is that human agency and decision-making matter and are a central part of the 
discussion (Chen & Miller, 2012). This final principle is particularly important for this 
study, since without agency, managerial cognition would be an irrelevant concept.  
The competitive dynamics literature has focused on structural and observable market and 
organizational factors that influence competition (Chen et al., 2007). One stream of 
research has specifically looked at the characteristics of the firm that initiates an attack or 
the firm that is contemplating a response. These characteristics are used to predict the 
likelihood and speed of response by the firm that has or will be on the receiving end of an 
attack. In one of the earlier studies, Smith et al. (1991) examine how characteristics such 
as organizational slack, experience and education of top managers, and structural 
complexity influence likelihood and lag of response. They also include propensity to 
imitate the original competitive move as an extra dependent variable. Finally, the authors 
link these response characteristics to organizational performance. Chen and Hambrick 
(1995) show that small firms differ from large ones in propensity, speed and visibility of 
competitive actions. In this case, the authors examine the differences in responsiveness, 
and the speed and visibility of those responses. Other studies have looked at top 
management team heterogeneity (e.g., Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996), resource slack 
(e.g., Ferrier, 2001), and current performance (e.g., Ferrier, Fhionnlaoich, Smith, & 
Grimm, 2002) as determinants of actions and responses. 
Likelihood and speed of response have been variables of interest in competitive 
dynamics, because the longer an attack from a rival goes without a response, the more 
time that rival has to take advantage of its benefits (Livengood & Reger, 2010; 
Schumpeter, 1934, 1950; Smith et al., 1991). Studies have also looked at the diversity 
and intensity of competitive actions and responses to a focal firm’s competitive moves 
and discussed how the nature and intensity of actions can influence competitive 
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advantage (e.g., Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999; Lee, Smith, Grimm, & Schomburg, 
2000). For example, Ferrier et al. (1999) have examined the tendency of market leaders 
to be less aggressive and use a limited set of competitive moves, on top of having a 
slower response time.  
Within the bounds of the four principles laid out previously, research on competitive 
dynamics has examined competition from various angles but except for a handful of 
mostly recent studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2007; Livengood & Reger, 2010; Marcel et al., 
2011), it has paid very little attention to the cognitive antecedents of competitive behavior 
and what actually motivates decision-makers when they engage in a competitive 
action/response. This is somewhat surprising since the most foundational framework in 
the industry (the Awareness-Motivation-Capability model) has elements that call for 
these concepts to be incorporated. This framework was one of the first comprehensive 
attempts aimed at exploring the antecedents of competitive behavior. 
In his seminal piece, Chen (1996) identified three important drivers of competitive action 
which is now widely referred to as the awareness-motivation-capability (AMC) 
framework (by action I am referring to both the initial action and the response to it). The 
first antecedent of competitive behavior is awareness. To respond to a threat, opportunity, 
or a specific competitive move, decision-makers within an organization must first be 
aware of it. As I discuss in later chapters, this element is closely related to concepts in the 
attention literature. The second antecedent is motivation. Decision-makers must be 
motivated to take action in the form of a competitive move or a response to a rival’s 
attack. Finally, it is important for an actor to have the capability to act/respond in the face 
of threats/opportunities. An actor might be aware of a move, and be motivated to 
respond, but without the required capabilities, it is difficult for the actor to initiate a 
response. 
Although the awareness-motivation-capability framework clearly has elements that call 
for more attention to human decision-making and cognition (especially awareness and 
motivation), studies have mostly used objective economics based factors to explain it. 
Review of the literature clearly shows that competitive dynamics research has mostly 
 
 
16 
 
focused on the economic modeling of actions and reactions based on rational economic 
criteria (Chen & Miller, 2012; Livengood & Reger, 2010). But in the AMC model for 
competitive action, much of the underlying factors affecting the awareness and 
motivation elements are rooted in cognitive phenomena. What organizations and their 
decision makers perceive, how they interpret, and their reactions are all influenced by 
individual level factors in addition to structural factors within the organization. Given this 
important argument, it makes sense to explore the role decision-makers’ cognition plays 
in competition. Interestingly, only a handful of studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2007; Kilduff et 
al., 2010; Marcel et al., 2011) have actually attempted to address these issues in the 
context of competitive dynamics. 
In an important and widely cited study, Chen et al. (2007) introduced the concept of 
competitive tension as an important cognitive concept. “Tension defines the forces that 
build up and tend to pull a static inter-firm relationship into dynamic behavioral interplay 
between rivals. It can be conceived of as a sort of energy storage agent: once there is 
enough build-up (perhaps as a consequence of prior battles or of managerial and industry 
psychology), competitive tension is likely to explode into rivalrous actions” (2007: p. 
103). What sets the abovementioned study apart from the mainstream competitive 
dynamics literature is its inclusion of perceptual factors. Also, as highlighted in the 
definition of competitive tension, managerial psychology and cognition is an important 
element in shaping those perceptions. Based on their understanding (and that of other 
industry players such as consultants or financial analysts), managers perceive a particular 
rival as their main competitor (Chen et al., 2007).  
Put differently, how managers and other industry players perceive each component of the 
awareness-motivation-capability framework plays an important role in the build-up of 
tension and the probable subsequent competitive actions that unfold between two firms. 
But what is missing in the Chen et al. (2007) study is attention to the underlying 
cognitive and psychological mechanisms that give rise to those perceptions. They have 
used very objective measures such as relative size of the involved firms to predict 
perceptions of rivalry. But there are important subjective elements that also influence 
these perceptions. These elements are not highlighted in Chen et al.’s (2007) study. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to note that this study was an important step in the move 
towards the incorporation of psychological factors in explaining competitive dynamics 
and opened the door for subsequent avenues of inquiry in this area. 
In a more recent study, Marcel et al. (2011) looked at a specific cognitive element and its 
link to competitive dynamics. Managers have perception about what parts of their 
activities contribute to the firm’s overall performance and based on this study, if a 
manager feels that a rival has attacked parts of the firm’s business that are crucial for it to 
perform, it is more likely to respond. In addition to this cognitive factor, the authors also 
consider a number of “cue variables” such as actor’s size and performance, 
organizational similarity, market commonality and attack intensity. These variables are 
the typical objective predictors that have been examined regularly in the competitive 
dynamics literature. But Marcel et al. (2011) take an additional step and examine the 
interaction between these cue variables and the cognitive phenomenon in their research. 
Additionally, their study is designed specifically to capture managerial perceptions as 
opposed to what is objectively crucial for their performance.  
And finally, research conducted on the psychology of rivalry (Kilduff et al., 2010) has 
focused on managerial cognition by proposing that rivals and competitive actions are not 
viewed and interpreted equally. Depending on which rival the action is coming from or 
the timing of that action, the perceived significance and subsequent interpretations will be 
different. Perceptions about rivals are created through prior experiences and interactions 
that might have introduced emotional or other subjective factors into the equation. These 
perceptions then guide competitive action and influence organizational performance. The 
authors test their hypotheses using data from NCAA basketball teams.  
My goal in this study is to build on the research discussed above and examine the 
perceptions and opinions of organizational decision makers and the underlying factors 
that influence those perceptions. These perceptions are extremely important since as 
psychologists have asserted for many years, cognition is what links environmental stimuli 
with decision-making and action. The following section reviews the literature on 
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cognition, attention (Ocasio, 1997), and behavioral strategy to discuss how they can help 
us better understand the dynamics of a competitive landscape. 
 
2.2 Cognition, Attention, and the Emergence of Behavioral Strategy 
I begin this section of my literature review with a brief overview of upper echelons 
theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). I do this because I have emphasized the role of 
managers’ interpretations in shaping strategy, and because this dissertation inevitably 
draws from some concepts that fall under this theory. Based on the bounded rationality 
principle (Cyert & March, 1963), Hambrick and Mason (1984) lay the foundations of 
upper echelons theory and argue that managers are unable to process an overwhelming 
number of external and internal stimuli so they select and interpret a select few based on 
their past experiences and mental frames. They argue that decision making is often the 
result of “behavioral factors” rather than a clear and objective economic optimization as 
discussed by the vast majority of the strategy literature at the time. The theory clearly 
asks us to look deeper into the black box of decision-making. 
As the theory states, a manager’s experiences, values, personal traits, and cognitive biases 
influence how he/she interprets an event which in turn relates to the nature of strategic 
choices (Gerstner, König, Enders, & Hambrick, 2013). Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
argue that these characteristics form a lens through which managers view the world 
around them. But a quick review of the literature on upper echelons reveals that most 
studies have focused on a set of easily measured characteristics such as education, age, 
functional experience, and socioeconomic roots to understand top management’s decision 
making process and outcomes (e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; 
Tyler & Steensma, 1998). Other studies have looked at the composition of top 
management teams (TMTs) as a predictor of strategic decision-making and action (e.g., 
Chen, Lin, & Michel, 2010; Ferrier et al., 2002; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; 
Hambrick et al., 1996). Hambrick (2007) has acknowledged that this emphasis on 
observable managerial characteristics (or team characteristics) has its limitations but it 
does provide a good starting point and relatively easily measurable variables. Having said 
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that, it might be problematic to draw a clear link between these measures and the 
psychological dimensions they are meant to represent. In rare cases, scholars have 
attempted to move beyond these objective characteristics to measure personality or 
cognition which are more nuanced determinants of behavior and much more difficult to 
measure.  
A more recent collection of studies in the upper echelons literature has focused on one 
particular personality trait (i.e., narcissism) and its influence on decision-making and 
behavior (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Gerstner et al., 2013). In one of the latest 
articles, Gerstner et al. (2013) examine how major pharmaceutical firms responded to 
significant biotechnology developments during a 28 year period. They show that 
narcissistic CEOs are more aggressive in responding to technological discontinuities. As 
is customary in the upper echelons literature, they show a link between a personality trait 
and strategic decision making. Although moving beyond age, tenure, and functional 
background and looking at personality is a step forward, it still fails to capture a 
manager’s cognitive orientations and mental frames that could result from personality or 
a host of other internal or environmental influences. 
In fact, many years have passed since Hambrick and Mason (1984) initially talked of a 
“gulf” between disciplines such as psychology and sociology and what we examine in 
strategic management. And while many studies have attempted to close the gap and bring 
the literatures together, there is still a lot to do and to research. Hambrick (2007), in a 
review of his seminal article, acknowledged that his stream of research has received little 
attention mainly due to the difficulties associated with measuring psychological issues 
and the required expertise in both the micro and macro organizational phenomena. He 
concedes that researchers have not looked inside the black box when dealing with 
cognitive orientations. This line of inquiry falls within the bounds of what is today 
labeled as the behavioral strategy research stream. 
The study of cognitive and social psychology is attracting growing attention in the 
strategy literature under a stream known as “behavioral strategy”. By incorporating 
concepts from human psychology, strategy scholars hope to base their arguments on 
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more realistic assumptions of human cognition and decision-making (Gavetti, 2012; 
Powell et al., 2011). Various streams of research such as behavioral theory of the firm 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1947), attention based view (Ocasio, 1997), managerial 
cognition (Greve, 1998; Walsh, 1995), sensemaking (Weick, 1995), mindfulness 
(Levinthal & Rerup, 2006), and aspiration (Greve, 2008) have a tradition of considering 
human cognition in exploring topics that are important for the study of strategic 
management. This body of research has aimed to create a link between an individual’s 
cognitive structure and decisions that impact strategy formulation and implementation 
(Narayanan et al., 2011; Porac & Thomas, 2002). It views managers as information 
processing entities that absorb, process, and disseminate often complex and ambiguous 
information (Walsh, 1995).  
But it seems that mainstream strategy research has largely focused on topics such as 
market power through barriers to entry, resources and capabilities, and technological 
change and innovation as sources of firm heterogeneity (Powell et al., 2011). The current 
resurgence in cognitive research in strategy (behavioral strategy) aims to highlight the 
importance of human cognition in explaining why firms behave differently in the face of 
environmental stimuli. To achieve this, scholars have moved away from the traditional 
level of analysis, which was the firm or business unit, to individuals and decision-makers 
within firms. By incorporating concepts from managerial cognition and attention in 
explaining competitive dynamics, this study fits within this stream of research. In-line 
with the objectives of behavioral strategy research (e.g., Powell et al., 2011), my goal is 
to bring theory in competitive dynamics closer to empirical facts and bridge the gap 
between research and practice. 
Decision biases and cognitive schemas are at the heart of behavioral strategy research 
(Powell et al., 2011). Because of cognitive limitations and biases, decision-makers might 
fail to see an opportunity or threat, might not give it enough weight, may fail to consider 
all possible responses, and therefore may resort to suboptimal behavior. This may have 
positive or negative consequences for firm performance and therefore, should be of 
importance to strategy scholars. Prior research has argued theoretically and examined 
empirically that when exposed to similar stimuli, decision-makers in different 
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organizations will interpret the issue differently (Daft & Weick, 1984; Thomas et al., 
1993; Thomas et al., 1994; Tyler & Steensma, 1998). This is partly due to both 
contextual and mental factors that direct the flow of information, attention and 
subsequently, interpretation (Daft & Weick, 1984; Ocasio, 1997). 
Huff (1982) was one of the pioneers of cognitively oriented research in strategy. She and 
others who followed him argued that socially constructed beliefs (as opposed to pure 
economic efficiency) influence the actions of organizations. But it was Porac, Thomas, 
and Baden-Fuller (1989)’s study of competition in the Scottish knitwear industry that 
started an interesting and fruitful body of literature which attempted to explore and 
examine the role of managerial cognition in strategic outcomes and processes (Kaplan, 
2011). Porac et al. (1989) and subsequently Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, and Kanfer 
(1995) argue that transactions among rivals usually take place at two distinct levels. First 
is the material level where actual resources are exchanged and the traditional economic 
concepts such as barriers to entry, mobility and elasticity are relevant. But the second 
level is cognitive where competition needs to be considered through the mental models of 
decision-makers and the interpretations that follow. They have also pointed to four 
assumptions that are necessary in the study of cognition and competition. These 
assumptions are also significant in my study.  
The first assumption identified by Porac et al. (1989) is the emphasis on the micro-
momentary actions of organizational members as determinants of processes and 
outcomes. This is identical to the assumption regarding the role of human agency in the 
competitive dynamics literature (Chen & Miller, 2012). This overlapping of assumptions 
indicates that these two streams of research can potentially interact to explain phenomena 
in better light. The second assumption states that there is an information-processing 
sequence through which individuals attend to cues, interpret them and then act based on 
those interpretations. Third, individuals interpret what they attend to by linking the 
received cues with their mental models. And finally, it is assumed that individuals can 
verbalize the content of their interpretations. This has important implications on how 
these interpretations can be measured in research studies. Porac et al. (1989) build on 
these assumptions to argue for an objective-subjective-objective transformation process 
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which makes it possible to create a shared understanding amongst a collective entity. This 
shared understanding is the basis of imitations and the creation of shared beliefs about 
what is labeled as “marketplace”.  
Their study does not however address how the mindsets of individuals specifically 
influence what they perceive. Put differently, it does not draw the link between specific 
mental models and interpretation of the environment. It is also not concerned with 
specific action/response dyads as highlighted in the competitive dynamics literature. 
Nevertheless, Porac et al.’s (1989, 1995) studies have opened the door to a whole new set 
of possibilities linking cognition to strategy. Kaplan (2011) has argued that although this 
body of research received early traction, the initial rush seemed to subside gradually. In 
particular, there seems to be a lack of attention to specific mental models and how they 
relate to organizational processes including competitive dynamics. It seems that after 
efforts in the 1980s and 1990s, the study of cognition gained legitimacy and acceptance 
and the literature has now moved towards more articulate and fine-grained discussions on 
the topic (Kaplan, 2011). This is encouraging since my study of cognition and 
competitive dynamics falls exactly within this emerging body of literature. Table 2-1 lists 
a number of important studies that fall under the behavioral strategy umbrella. 
I now delve deeper into the topic of behavioral strategy and discuss an important concept 
that is crucial in our understanding of managerial cognition. As mentioned earlier, the 
aim of research in behavioral strategy is to highlight the importance of mental structures 
and cognitive processes in the explanation of strategy (Narayanan et al., 2011). Walsh 
(1995) has provided a detailed description of mental models and how they influence what 
gets noticed and interpreted in organizations. Mental models are shaped through 
experience and are the basis of associative thinking. In associative thinking, an individual 
organizes his/her knowledge and experiences into mental categories and schemes and 
when faced with novel situations, the individual recognizes it associatively in terms of 
what he/she knows through current mental models. As Gavetti (2012) has also pointed 
out the new situation is represented in a way that is consistent with the schemata used to 
make sense of it. This new experience will then become part of the available set of 
knowledge structures (Walsh, 1995).  
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An important issue to note is that the presence of mental models and schemata has both 
positive and negative outcomes. They facilitate thinking and decision-making in the face 
of limited information and analyzing capability, but on the other hand, they can mask 
other stimuli that can be potentially consequential (Narayanan et al., 2011). They can 
blind the decision-maker to other aspects of the information that do not fit the current 
knowledge structures (Walsh, 1995). Knowledge structures and schemas are important in 
our study of competitive dynamics since managers decide on their firm’s competitive 
behavior based on how they perceive the competitive environment and their own 
organization (i.e. resources and capabilities) (Chen et al., 2007; Grimm, Lee, & Smith, 
2006). How decision-makers respond to particular environmental events depends on how 
they interpret them (as threat or opportunity) (Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan, 1983), and 
their interpretations are deeply rooted in their mental structures and also the way their 
organization has channeled attention (Ocasio, 1997). 
Mental models and knowledge structures have been measured through a variety of 
techniques. The psychology literature has often resorted to experiments to capture the 
content of mental models (Walsh, 1995). While this used to be a fruitful avenue of 
inquiry in earlier years, scholars have now urged researchers to move beyond simple 
studies on the content of knowledge structures and move to examine the link between 
cognition and behaviors that result in organizational outcomes and processes. Studies in 
business on the other hand have mostly done just that and have used surveys and analysis 
of secondary data (e.g., Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008) in order to 
measure and test how mental models influence organizational outcomes. Clark and 
Mackaness’s (2001) study is an example of an attempt to actually capture a manager’s 
mental models and the cognitive maps they use in making important strategic decisions. 
In another study, Thomas et al. (1993) examine firms in a highly competitive and 
dynamic industry. In these contexts firms face a complex and demanding environment 
and managers need to come up with interpretations for ambiguous information. They 
explain that how a manager chooses to interpret an event and how he/she chooses to label 
it based on mental categories, determine their behavioral response. Their findings also 
show that the nature of top managers' interpretations will be related to change in products 
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and services. In a similar article on antecedents and consequences of issue interpretation 
in organizations, Thomas et al. (1994) point out that both the content of the issue and the 
multi-level interpretive contexts within which decision-makers are placed determine how 
individuals interpret a given phenomenon. In addition to the studies mentioned above, a 
host of other studies have examined the link between interpretation and action (e.g., 
Ranson, Hinings, & Royston, 1980; Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005). These studies will 
help lay the foundation for my theoretical arguments linking specific aspects of 
managerial cognition to competitive dynamics. For example, they might help explain 
why two different managers might look at a particular competitive move by a rival, with 
one interpreting it as an opportunity, and the other seeing it as a potential problem.  
To examine how mental models and knowledge schemas influence decisions and 
behavior, we need to understand the two interrelated concepts of attention and 
sensemaking. Attention can be considered a mediator between the mental structures 
discussed above and the decision-making process. The literature on managerial cognition 
and attention is quite clear in stating that managers can only make sense of and act on 
issues that have attracted their attention (Hambrick, 1981; Ocasio, 1997). Attention has 
been defined as “the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time and effort by 
organizational decision-makers on both (a) issues: the available repertoire of categories 
for making sense of the environment; problems, opportunities and threats; and (b) 
answers: the available repertoire of action alternatives; proposals, routines, projects, 
programs, and procedures” (Ocasio, 1997, p. 189).   
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Table ‎2-1 List of important studies in behavioral strategy 
Article Topic Method 
Daft, Sormunen, and Parks 
(1988) 
Managerial perceptions regarding the importance and 
uncertainty of a sector influence their scanning mode 
and frequency. 
Structured interviews used to capture perceptions of 
managers at medium sized manufacturing companies. 
Porac et al. (1989) Authors argue that mental models of managers 
determine perceptions of competition and the 
subsequent responses to competitive moves. 
Interviews and analysis of secondary data used to 
extract cognitive taxonomies of managers. 
Porac and Thomas (1994) Examines the relationship between cognitive 
taxonomies of organizational forms and competitor 
definition in a local economy. 
Cognitive taxonomic interviews of owner/manager or 
non-owner/managers of small retail stores. 
Hodgkinson and Johnson 
(1994) 
There is within and between organizational variances 
in cognitive orientation towards competitive structures. 
A cognitive taxonomic approach similar to Porac et al. 
(1994) using a sample of 23 retail managers. 
Thomas et al. (1994) The identity belief held by TMT is related to managers’ 
interpretation of organizational issues. 
Questionnaire used to measure beliefs about identity. 
Porac et al. (1995) Authors discuss the social construction of competition 
in one industry. 
Interviews and questionnaires used to measure mental 
frames and perceptions. 
Hodgkinson (1997b) Examines the stability and inertia of mental models in 
an industry that is known for high velocity. Inhibitive 
role of cognition in adapting to changing market 
conditions. 
 
Use of competitive analysis questionnaire to measure 
mental frames. 
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Barr (1998) The author demonstrates how managers’ 
interpretations evolve as they respond to environmental 
events. 
Letters to shareholders are used to identify 
interpretations.  
Bogner and Barr (2000) Paper discussed nature and process of sensemaking in 
hypercompetitive environments. 
Theory paper. Framework development. 
Daniels, Johnson, and de 
Chernatony (2002) 
The role of competitive environment in creating 
divergence of managerial cognition between 
organizations and senior managers and the role of 
institutional environment in industry, strategic groups 
and functions. 
Visual card-sorting techniques and Kelly’s repertory 
grid for ideographic mapping of mental models. 
Garg, Walters, and Priem 
(2003) 
Perceived environmental dynamism influences 
managerial attention to internal functions or external 
environment. 
Questionnaire used to measure managerial attention to 
internal vs. external environment. 
Cho and Hambrick (2006) Study looks at how an important event in the industry 
can influence manager’s attention towards a more 
entrepreneurial orientation. 
Letters to shareholders and annual reports are 
analyzed to measure entrepreneurial attention. 
Automated text analysis and word search. 
Yadav, Prabhu, and Chandy 
(2007) 
The effect of CEO’s attention towards the future and 
his/her external or internal focus is related to the speed 
of new technology detection, development of new 
products and deployment of new products. 
Letters to shareholders are used to measure attention 
patterns.  
Nadkarni and Narayanan 
(2007a) 
Collective assumptions and social networks shape collective 
strategy frames that lead to actions and practices. 
Content analysis of annual reports and causal mapping 
used to identify strategy frames.  
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Nadkarni and Narayanan 
(2007b) 
Authors show that the complexity and focus of strategic 
schemas influence strategic flexibility which in turn 
relates to performance. 
CEO letters to shareholders are analyzed to identify 
cognitive schemas. 
A test to show letters are in fact reliable. 
Nadkarni and Barr (2008) The study links industry velocity to managers’ attention 
focus and their environment-strategy causal logic. 
These in turn influence speed of strategic response. 
Letters to shareholders are used as the primary source 
of data. Content analysis techniques are used to 
extract causal maps. 
Kaplan (2008) Examines the interaction of CEO cognition, 
organizational capabilities and organizational 
incentives in shaping strategy during a technological 
revolution. 
Attention to a new technology was measured by 
content analysis of letters to shareholders. 
Eggers and Kaplan (2009) CEO attention to emerging technology is associated 
with earlier entry into a new product market and the 
opposite holds for CEO attention to existing 
technology. 
Longitudinal study of firms in one industry. CEO 
attention is measured through analysis of letters to 
shareholders. 
Marcel et al. (2011) Authors argue that managers’ perception of a causal 
link between a particular competitive action and 
performance outcome determine the likelihood and 
speed of response to that move. 
A structure content analysis of letter’s to shareholders 
to identify cognitive frames. 
 
  
 
 
28 
 
What complicates this process is the fact that managers are faced with a myriad of issues 
at any given point of time and are limited in their ability to fully comprehend every single 
environmental stimulus around them. This is due to the fact that we as human beings are 
boundedly rational and have limited capacity to process information (Cyert & March, 
1963; Simon, 1947). It is also possible that those issues that are of lesser importance are 
more readily available while those that are consequential to firm performance could be 
very subtle and hidden from attention (Garg et al., 2003). This statement is true for a 
wide range of issues including competitive actions. Those actions that are rather 
inconsequential to a focal organization’s strategy and operations might become more 
salient in the process of sensemaking while those that could have a major impact remain 
undetected or dismissed as something insignificant. 
Yu et al. (2005) have built on Ocasio’s (1997) Attention Based View framework to argue 
that attention can be examined from both a structural and a sensemaking perspective. In 
the structural approach, an organization’s formal and informal structures are highlighted 
as factors that influence the allocation of attention. This is in line with Cyert and March’s 
(1963) work on channeling information and decisions across the organization. Structures 
are communication channels, roles and also the accepted norms within the organization 
that help channel members’ attention (Ocasio, 1997). Put differently, the focus of 
attention is influenced by various operational and governance channels present in the firm 
(Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). In fact, these structural characteristics also influence what is 
detected from a host of stimuli (i.e. competitive moves) outside the organization. The 
sensemaking view on the other hand, emphasizes the role of a decision maker’s mental 
schemes and structures in determining the target of attention. But both of these views are 
part of a top-down process in organizational attention.  
Ocasio (2011) has identified two distinct processes in how a decision maker selects the 
focus of his/her attention. First, as we mentioned above, is the top-down process which 
argues that goals, task demands and prior cognitive orientations (schemas) select the 
focus of attention. The other is the bottom-up approach which deals with the 
characteristics of the stimuli and what makes them stand out amongst others (Ocasio, 
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2011). In the context of competitive dynamics, the characteristics of the competitive 
action and the organization that is initiating it are important factors that can be considered 
in a bottom-up attention process. As my review of the research on competitive dynamics 
revealed the majority of articles in this literature have in fact focused on these aspects of 
competition. Overall, in any research on organizational attention, it is absolutely 
important to clearly describe which of these two processes (top-down and bottom-up) are 
being considered. 
Salience of an environmental event is an important factor when discussing organizational 
attention. It can be examined using both the top-down and bottom-up approaches 
described above. A salient event has characteristics that make it more likely to be noticed 
by observers (Sutcliffe & Huber, 1998). It also directly influences how an event is 
perceived and forms the basis of future mental models (Weick, 1995). A large number of 
studies that have addressed salience, take the bottom-up approach (e.g., Bonardi & Keim, 
2005). In these studies, an external event is salient due to its own characteristics and 
features. Sutcliffe and Huber (1998) refer to this as the strength of the situation and 
Mitsuhashi (2012) labels the phenomenon as “objective salience” in his study of biases in 
vicarious learning. In looking at errors in nuclear power plant operations, he argues that 
errors can be more salient because they have substantial negative effects for various 
stakeholders. In this approach, the observer’s mental structures take a back seat and 
salience becomes a feature almost independent from them.  
It can be assumed that more salient events are also more important but this is not 
necessarily accurate. Rerup (2009) argues that weak cues in the environment can contain 
information regarding threats or opportunities with significant consequences for the 
organization. He builds on concepts such as mindfulness in high reliability organizations 
to argue that less salient stimuli also merit attention. Rerup (2009) concludes by offering 
a set of recommendations on structures and processes that organizations need to 
implement in order to direct attention towards important weak cues. What this study also 
shows is that attending to weak cues requires effort and investment from the organization 
while more salient events capture attention more easily and effortlessly. 
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In addition to the bottom-up processes, the top-down approach to attention can also help 
us understand the concept of salience. Managerial cognition, organizational structures, 
and shared beliefs within an organization can also make an event more salient in the eyes 
of particular individuals. In contrast to the previous definition which was independent 
from the individual, this definition relies heavily on mental structures of the observer. For 
example, Mitsuhashi (2012) argued that an event becomes “contextually salient” when it 
is different to what individuals are used to, or have observed in prior experiences. This 
top-down approach has been explained extensively in both the attention and sensemaking 
literatures. Although most of the hypotheses in my study address the top-down processes 
(related to cognition), when I discuss “salience” specifically, the bottom-up definition is 
intended. This is closer to the concept of social salience which represents the prominence 
of an event in a specific social context (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). As I discuss in the 
subsequent chapter, salience (in its bottom-up form) will moderate the effect of cognition 
on competitive dynamics. 
I conclude this section by reviewing the role of mental models in the process of 
sensemaking (Weick et al., 2005). How an individual makes sense of his/her 
surroundings and the events that are unfolding in the environment are highly influenced 
by the current mental models and schemas. In fact, Weick (1995) describes sensemaking 
as the process through which individuals compare cues extracted from the environment 
with their mental models based on past experiences. He also argues that in the process of 
making sense, individuals often enact a world that affirms their currently held mental 
models. Individuals store beliefs in their mental models and act as if these beliefs are 
reality, thus eliciting behavior from others consistent with these beliefs. The 
organizational sensemaking perspective provides another view on attention, describing 
the factors that influence how organizational members interpret the issues that gain their 
attention and how these interpretations affect subsequent attention (Weick, 1995). 
Finally, it is important to realize that based on Nigam and Ocasio’s (2010) arguments on 
sensemaking and attention, while attention to particular competitive moves within the 
industry is rooted in previous mental models, this process itself is creating new mental 
models that direct future sensemaking and attention. 
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2.3 Regulatory Focus Theory 
Regulatory focus theory (RFT) is a well-established topic in the psychology literature 
which has looked at both the antecedents and consequences of an individual’s tendency 
to be more achievement focused or prevention focused (Higgins, 1998). This stream of 
research explains that when faced with the same environmental phenomena, individuals 
differ in the way they cognitively frame and act on information (Wowak & Hambrick, 
2010). More specifically, the theory suggests that prevention focused individuals frame 
environmental events as potential losses and act in a way that minimizes the chance of 
negative outcomes. On the contrary, promotion focused individuals frame external events 
as possible gains and act to maximise positive outcomes (Higgins, 1998). The fact that 
individuals frame the same issue in different ways is an indication that regulatory foci are 
in fact cognitive orientations and mental models. It is because of this feature that I find it 
fitting to explore its role in predicting strategic actions (i.e. competitive moves).  
Regulatory focus theory was initially introduced by Higgins (1998). He based his 
arguments on Atkinson’s (1964) hedonic principle of seeking pleasure or averting pain. 
Regulatory foci are broad constructs that cover a large collection of cognitive orientations 
and behaviors. As Van Dijk and Kluger (2011) have summarized, prevention focused 
individuals tend to have “minimal goals, a short-term perspective, sensitivity to social 
pressures, and concern with goal maintenance, conservation, keeping the status quo.” 
Goals are also viewed as an “obligation, or something they have to do”. Promotion 
focused individuals on the other hand tend to “strive for maximal goals, long term 
perspective, attunement to internal and intrinsic needs, and concerns with development, 
change, and ideals.” In this orientation, goals are viewed as “a desire and as something 
that people feel that they are eager to do” (from Kluger & Ganzach, 2004: p.78). In a 
more fundamental sense, RFT states that an individual’s behavior is guided by a need for 
nurturance in the case of promotion focus, and the need for security in the prevention 
focus mode. Additionally, prevention-focused individuals tend to frame goal pursuits and 
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outcomes in terms of losses versus non-losses while promotion focused individuals think 
in terms of gains versus non-gains (Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). Promotion 
focused individuals also tend to be eager to achieve a goal, while prevention oriented 
individuals are vigilant to avoid a disaster (Higgins, 1998). As Zhu and Meyers-Levy 
(2007) have put differently, because of the different views towards goals and outcomes, 
promotion focused individuals have a “natural tendency to approach matches to their 
goals” (p. 89) while prevention focused individuals have a “tendency to avoid 
mismatches to their goals” (p. 90). 
Wowak and Hambrick (2010) compare promotion focus individuals to those who view 
the glass as half full and work to maximise gains in the situation at hand. These 
individuals also tend to take more risk and also seek novel options based on their positive 
framing of the event (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 
1999). Prevention focused individuals on the other hand see the glass as half empty and 
work to minimise or avoid losses. They also do their best to avoid mistakes and stay 
away from alternatives that have a higher degree of risk. Research in a variety of 
literatures has shown that regulatory focus has an influence on judgement and behavior. 
After numerous studies in social and cognitive psychology, RFT found its way into the 
management literature as an important aspect of human cognition. As I discuss in this 
section, this presence has largely been limited to literatures in marketing (e.g., Chernev, 
2004; Jain, Agrawal, & Maheswaran, 2006), entrepreneurship (e.g., Brockner, Higgins, & 
Low, 2004; Hmieleski & Baron, 2008), and organizational behavior (e.g., Brockner & 
Higgins, 2001; Crowe & Higgins, 1997) and except for a small number of studies, the 
strategy literature has overlooked this element of human cognition. A list of sample 
articles that have examined RFT is presented in Table 2-2. 
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Table ‎2-2 List of important articles that have examined regulatory focus 
Author (s) Study Measure 
Higgins, Shah, and 
Friedman (1997) 
The moderating role of regulatory focus on the 
relationship between goal attainment and 
emotional response. 
A new measure based on the Original Selves 
Questionnaire by Higgins (1989). Measuring 
reaction times to questions about ideal and 
ought selves. 
Liberman et al. (1999) Promotion or prevention focus and the choice 
between stability and change 
Measure adopted from Higgins et al. (1997) 
Higgins et al. (2001) A history of success with promotion or 
prevention orientation orients individuals to use 
the same approach when faced with new tasks. 
Development of the Regulatory Focus 
Questionnaire (RFQ) 
Liberman, Molden, Idson, 
and Higgins (2001) 
Regulatory focus influences alternative 
generation and discounting. 
Measure adopted from Higgins et al. (1997) 
Lockwood, Jordan, and 
Kunda (2002) 
The effect of regulatory focus on motivation by 
positive or negative role models. 
Individuals primed through words or asking 
them to explain prevention or promotion related 
experiences. 
Shah, Brazy, and Higgins 
(2004) 
Regulatory focus and the emotional and 
behavioral expression of intergroup bias 
Indirect measurement using practical scenarios 
Brockner et al. (2004) Authors argue that some aspects of Theory development paper. 
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entrepreneurial behavior fit prevention focus 
while others require promotion focus. 
Chernev (2004) Promotion and prevention oriented individuals 
differ in their tendency to keep the status quo. 
Priming exercises to induce 
prevention/promotion orientation 
Wallace and Chen (2006) Regulatory focus mediates the relationship 
between conscientiousness and production/safety 
performance 
Regulatory Focus at Work Scale (RWS) 
(Wallace & Chen, 2005). 
Zhu and Meyers-Levy 
(2007) 
Promotion focus/prevention focus are linked to 
relational/item-specific elaboration 
Prevention of Promotion orientation induced 
through situational stimuli using (Higgins, 
Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994) methodology 
Ouschan, Boldero, Kashima, 
Wakimoto, and Kashima 
(2007) 
Development of a scale that measures promotion 
or prevention orientation for goal pursuit 
Development of the Regulatory Focus 
Strategies Scale (RFSS) 
Neubert, Kacmar, Carlson, 
Chonko, and Roberts (2008) 
Regulatory focus mediates the relationship 
between leadership styles and follower behavior. 
Development of Work Regulatory Focus 
(WRF) Scale 
Spanjol and Tam (2010) The effect of regulatory focus fit in dyadic teams 
on their willingness to make a decision 
regarding change. 
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 
2001) 
Wowak and Hambrick 
(2010) 
Moderating effect of regulatory focus on the 
relationship between stock options and executive 
Theory article 
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behavior (risk-taking) 
De Bock and Van Kenhove 
(2010) 
Promotion or prevention focus influence an 
individual’s tolerance of unethical behavior. 
BIS/BAS scales used to measure chronic 
regulatory focus. 
Van Dijk and Kluger (2011) Task type influences individuals’ regulatory 
focus (effect of situational factors) 
Scenarios used to induce regulatory focus. 
Questionnaire. 
Wallace, Butts, Johnson, 
Stevens, and Smith (2013) 
Employee regulatory focus is linked to 
innovation via thriving. Employee involvement 
climate moderates the relationship.  
Regulatory focus measured using survey 
developed by Wallace and Colleagues (2008). 
Multilevel analysis. 
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A study by Zhu and Meyers-Levy (2007) in marketing has looked at the underlying 
cognitive mechanisms for regulatory focus. Their results have important implications for 
my study of responses to competitive dynamics. They argue that promotion-focused 
individuals are inclined towards relational elaboration, meaning they form an integrated 
and abstract understanding of themes when faced with a body of information. Prevention 
focused individuals on the other hand engage in item-specific elaboration which means 
they give context-specific associations to each piece of information independent of 
others. Another important consequence drawn from prevention or promotion orientation 
is that promotion-focused individuals are more open to change, while prevention focused 
individuals prefer stability (Liberman et al., 1999). In an interesting experiment 
conducted in another marketing study, Chernev (2004) shows that when faced with an 
important investment decision (for retirement funds), prevention-focused individuals are 
significantly more likely to choose inaction. Interestingly, one of the alternatives was 
clearly superior to the other and thus the results clearly show a tendency towards inaction 
in individuals with prevention focus.  
Individuals with different regulatory foci not only perceive their environments 
differently, they also react to environmental stimuli in a different manner. Promotion 
oriented individuals seek to avoid missing an opportunity they desire and therefore act 
immediately without lengthy reflective deliberation. But prevention oriented individuals 
seek to avoid mistakes, and to achieve this, they resort to careful assessment of the 
circumstances and consequences of an action (De Bock & Van Kenhove, 2010). 
Researchers have also looked at the underlying causes responsible for the development of 
regulatory foci in individuals. Although there is debate in the psychology literature on the 
extent to which situational factors induce prevention or promotion orientations, there 
seems to be consensus that there is an important chronic individual element that is stable 
over time (Higgins, 1997). Individuals develop their specific orientation towards self-
regulation which is engrained through childhood experiences and interactions (Higgins, 
1998; Higgins & Silberman, 1998). This implies that regardless of situational factors, 
individuals tend to have prevention or promotion tendencies because of their life 
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experiences and this tendency remains relatively stable. Under these orientations, 
individuals are either motivated by security or growth and seek a goal because they have 
to or because they seek a desired outcome (Brockner & Higgins, 2001; Brockner et al., 
2004; Higgins, 1997, 1998; Van Dijk & Kluger, 2011).  
Both the chronic individual component and some situational elements are of importance 
in the study of RFT (Brockner et al., 2004). On top of chronic causes for each of these 
orientations that are rooted in life experiences, prevention or promotion focus can also be 
due to situational influences. In fact, a number of research studies (e.g., Crowe & 
Higgins, 1997; Liberman et al., 2001; Van Dijk & Kluger, 2011) have manipulated 
respondents to induce regulatory focus through scenarios and situational elements, or 
have assumed this to be the case. This is further evidence that the environment, structure, 
and situation an individual finds him or herself in can determine his or her regulatory 
focus. As I discuss, this could have implications for organizations since the policies, 
routines, and structures they adopt can influence the regulatory focus of managers and 
employees who work in that environment. This could also mean that individuals (e.g., 
managers) who work in an organization can have a different regulatory focus to those in 
another, because of these situational factors. For example, McMullen et al. (2009) have 
argued that the conduct of mid-level managers influences the regulatory focus of top 
decision-makers within an organization. Additionally, organizations may have 
institutionalized a particular regulatory orientation amongst its members. This may be a 
product of the organizations culture and various structures (Das & Kumar, 2011). The 
result of these two relatively stable influencing factors determine how an individual 
perceives stimuli. 
Van Dijk and Kluger (2011) propose that the nature of tasks carried out by individuals in 
organizations induce promotion or prevention focus. They argue that tasks that require 
some degree of eagerness and creativity are perceived as desirable which correspond to 
gains and goals that a promotion oriented individual would like to obtain. On the 
contrary, tasks that require vigilance and conformity are those that are usually done 
because they are mandatory and are perceived as an obligation. An individual usually 
undertakes them because failure to do so will result in negative outcomes that a 
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prevention oriented individual seeks to avoid. This is another important study that clearly 
highlights how situational factors in organizations can influence the regulatory focus of 
those that work there. So it is completely possible to have differences in regulatory focus 
amongst major decision makers that work for different organizations.  
A review of the literature revealed three articles that have specifically looked at 
regulatory foci in topics that are of interest to strategy scholars. Wowak and Hambrick’s 
(2010) theory article looks at individual level factors that moderate the relationship 
between CEO compensation arrangements and risk-taking behavior. One of the 
individual level factors examined in this study is regulatory focus. Using general 
arguments from RFT, they propose that executives’ risk taking behavior is not affected 
by stock options when they are either strongly prevention focus or strongly promotion 
focus oriented. But when orientation is moderate and in-between, stock options will be 
positively related to risk-taking by the CEO. Although this is an application of RFT to an 
important topic in the strategy literature, the developed propositions in their study remain 
untested. 
Das and Kumar’s (2011) study of RFT’s role in determining inter-firm alliance behavior 
is another example of this theory’s application to topics in the strategy literature. They 
specifically link promotion or prevention focus to a partner’s tolerance of opportunism in 
different stages of alliance development. The authors also develop propositions linking 
RFT to the complexity of contracts, resolution of inter-partner conflict, and the nature of 
control systems. One issue that stands out in this article is that the authors have attributed 
regulatory orientation to organizations as opposed to individuals. They have used 
institutionalization and dominant coalitions as their arguments for this jump in the level 
of analysis.  
In another study, Chiaburu (2010) has theoretically linked prevention or promotion focus 
to strategic processes and outcomes. Specifically, he argues that the kind of regulatory 
orientation determines the kind of strategy, organizational structure, tendency towards 
change, and interest to particular organizational functions. What is interesting in all these 
attempts at incorporating RFT into strategic management topics is that all are theoretical 
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articles. The strategy literature is lacking any empirical attempts to test the effects of 
regulatory focus on strategic outcomes. In this dissertation, my aim is to address this 
empirical gap. 
 
2.4 Organizational Identity 
When speaking of cognitive frames and mental models, organizational identity is a 
powerful construct that has the ability to influence an individual’s attention pattern. It can 
also be viewed as a collective mental frame that members use to make sense of what goes 
on in their environment (Weick, 1995). Identity is the central, distinctive, and enduring 
characteristic of an organization and it defines the sense of who the members of that 
organization perceive themselves and the organization to be (Albert & Whetten, 1985). 
To put it differently, “Identity is about us—as individuals and as organization members—
and it enquires into the deepest level of our sensemaking and understanding” (Gioia, 
2008, p. 66). Gioia and Thomas (1996) have also defined identity as “Those features of 
the organization that members perceive as ostensibly central, enduring, and distinctive in 
character that contribute to how they define the organization and their identification with 
it” (p. 372).  
The key word in the preceding sentences is “perceive” which points to the fact that 
organizational identity is a cognitive representation held by members of an organization, 
including its key decision-makers, such as the CEO and other high-level managers 
(Elsbach & Kramer, 1996). A recent study by Hsu and Elsbach (2013) offers arguments 
and evidence that emphasize the cognitive and perceptual nature of organizational 
identity. Their study shows that an individual’s understanding of identity has roots in two 
distinct but simultaneous psychological processes-one that is related to self-enhancement, 
and a spontaneous cognitive element rooted in past experiences within an organization. 
Another key aspect of identity is that it is also social in nature and is situated in context 
(Fiol, 2001). Albert, Ashforth, and Dutton (2000) have argued that identity is inherently 
linked to an entity’s relationships with others and how they view themselves compared to 
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the others. A key word in the definition of identity is also the distinctive nature of it. For 
something to be distinctive, it needs to be compared to traits and characteristics of other 
individuals or organizations. Now, these distinctions might not be objectively verifiable 
but rather beliefs held by members of an organization (Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, & 
Corley, 2013). This argument also emphasizes that what constitutes identity is cognitive 
by definition and it only rests in the minds of individuals thinking about the defining 
factors of themselves or other entities.  
An important question we need to ask is whether identity is one central element that 
represents and describes the organization or is it made up of a number of elements with 
different degrees of importance. While some researchers have argued for a grand and 
overarching single identity (e.g., Ashforth & Mael, 1989), others believe that each 
organization can have multiple identities or an identity with a number of different 
elements (e.g., Corley, 2004; Foreman & Whetten, 2002; Pratt & Foreman, 2000). Hsu 
and Elsbach (2013) show that both groups of scholars can be right depending on how you 
define what is central and what is not. They argue that there are elements of 
organizational identity for which members do not share a unified understanding or do not 
categorize as part of their identity. But it seems that there are always core categories that 
are identified by almost everyone as central elements of identity which are salient and 
important. 
“Enduring” is also a key element in the definition of organizational identity. Since 
identity has its roots in an organization’s history, its core features will remain unchanged 
even as the organization itself goes through change over time (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 
2000). Although a growing number of researchers have suggested that there is some 
degree of fluidity in the conception of organizational identity (e.g., Dutton & Dukerich, 
1991; Gioia & Thomas, 1996), others still hold the belief that it does not change in the 
short-term and a span of a few years (e.g., Brown & Starkey, 2000). Based on a review of 
the literature, it appears that researchers fall into one of two groups in their attempt to 
understand changes to organizational identity. The first group believe that changes to 
identity are only possible when members of an organization are faced with changes or 
disruptive events such as mergers, acquisitions or sudden regulatory shocks (e.g., Anteby 
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& Molnár, 2012; Clark, Gioia, Ketchen, & Thomas, 2010; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Dutton, 
Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Margolis & Hansen, 2002), and only under specific 
circumstances. The second group of researchers however agree that changes happen, but 
in a more subtle and gradual way that is very hard to detect, especially by those inside the 
organization (e.g., Gioia et al., 2000). Gioia et al. (2013) propose the term continuity 
instead of endurance to describe identity. They also point to an important phenomenon 
where members of an organization might use enduring words (same labels) to describe 
their identity even though the meaning of those words has changed gradually and 
unconsciously. Researchers have also looked at the process of identity change in 
organizations.  
The literature has looked at the concept of identity from two rather distinct and 
foundational perspectives: Social actor perspective, and social constructionist perspective 
(Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). In the social actor perspective, organizational identity is stated 
through explicit institutional claims that influence individuals’ perception of what defines 
the organization. Narratives and stories about what defines the entity reinforce the sense 
of collective identity (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). The social 
constructionist perspective on the other hand does not talk about formal institutional 
claims, and considers identity as an evolving collective understanding of what the 
organization stands for and its defining characteristics (e.g., Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; 
Gioia & Thomas, 1996). This perspective focuses on labels and meanings used by 
members to define themselves and articulate who they are as an organization (Gioia et al., 
2013). Although the two perspectives seem to approach identity with completely different 
lenses, Gioia, Price, Hamilton, and Thomas (2010) argue that they are in fact “mutually 
constitutive” in explaining identity formation and development. In essence, they argue 
that to instill a collective understanding, members need to make some overt claims to 
help make identity claims legitimized and this legitimization in turn helps strengthen the 
collective understanding. 
In addition to these two key perspectives, Gioia et al. (2013) also discuss institutionalist 
and population ecologist approaches to identity with the first focusing on sameness due to 
institutional pressures and the second putting an emphasis on categories and the features 
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attributed to them by outside observers. But Gioia et al. (2010) downplay the central role 
of industrial categorization and institutional pressures and argue that they constrain, 
rather than define identities. Although there are many important details for each of these 
perspectives, our goal here is to examine why and how members react to threats aimed at 
their organizational identity. It seems that the first two perspectives are more relevant in 
our approach to measuring member’s belief about organizational identity as they are 
more theoretically compatible with our definition and understanding of the construct. 
Dutton et al. (1994) have also proposed a different but related categorization for how 
organizational identity is perceived. The first is members’ perceived organizational 
identity which refers to what individuals believe to be the attributes that define their 
organization. And the second is their construed external identity referring to what 
individuals think outsiders believe is the defining attributes of their organization (Elsbach 
& Kramer, 1996). Although not completely the same classification, these two categories 
explain the differences in the definitions for image and identity. Image is defined as what 
external actors perceive the organization to be while identity is an organization’s sense 
and understanding of what it stands for (Gioia et al., 2000; Gioia & Thomas, 1996). Due 
to this distinction, studies looking at threats to organizational image mostly explore 
impression management tactics as responses to those threats (e.g., Elsbach, 1994), which 
as I discuss, are clearly different to the strategies used in response to identity threats. In 
this dissertation, I consider both perspectives regarding identity since regardless of the 
reference point individuals feel strongly about what defines their group or organization. 
When studying the concept of organizational identity, it is important to keep in mind that 
we are dealing with multiple levels of analysis (Foreman & Whetten, 2002). The 
literature is quite clear that an individual’s identity or personal self is distinct from the 
social self which is the identity of the collective entity the individual is a part of (Brewer 
& Gardner, 1996). But the identity of individuals within an organization and the 
collective identity of the organization are closely related (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton 
et al., 1994; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996) and human beings are known to define themselves 
in terms of their relationships with collective entities such as organizations and evaluate 
themselves based on the social identity of these collective entities (Brewer & Gardner, 
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1996). Because an individual’s identity can be shaped through relationships with others 
within a group, any change in the collective identity also invokes a change at the 
individual level (Brown & Starkey, 2000). It is also important to note that although 
identity is a predominantly cognitive concept which resides in the minds of individuals 
within the organization (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991), it can also manifest itself in the 
collective practices, routines and processes of an organization (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; 
Nag, Corley, & Gioia, 2007). 
Literature on organizational identity has suggested that individuals usually respond when 
they feel that what they perceive to be their organization’s identity has come under threat 
(Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Livengood & Reger, 2010). Brown 
and Starkey (2000) discuss various ways through which organizations defend their 
identity and argue that this can restrict organizational learning and change that can be 
needed to respond to environmental demands. They argue that any change targeted at 
existing collective self-concepts is ignored or resisted and therefore, identity remains 
stable over time. A threat is usually perceived when the desired image, core 
characteristics, and defining aspects of the organization are threatened (Elsbach & 
Kramer, 1996). This is partly because they associate the positive identity attributed to the 
organization to their own social identity (Dutton et al., 1994) and as a result, if that 
positive image is attacked, their personal identity is also threatened. To fend off these 
threats, they do all they can to preserve the perceived identity (Fiol, 1991). People want 
to be associated with an entity that has a positive identity which usually translates to a 
positive image displayed to everyone outside the organization. As a result they do 
anything to reaffirm the positive perceptions about their organization to preserve their 
own positive social identity (Dutton et al., 1994). 
Also, as discussed in social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg & Abrams, 
1988), the individual usually forms both affective and cognitive bonds to collective 
entities (Brewer & Gardner, 1996), which might explain reactions when the identity of 
those entities come under threat. We, as human beings, value our social identities because 
they are a central element in our self-image and self-esteem and any environmental 
stimuli that comes near them will likely lead to some form of emotional response 
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(Kreiner, Ashforth, & Sluss, 2006). These reactions are typically for two reasons. One is 
resulting from concern for the individual’s self-interest and the other is from a concern 
for the well-being of the group (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Additionally, it seems that 
self-esteem and self-consistency are also two powerful forces that lead to reaction when 
identity is threatened (Brown, 1997). Identity is defended “to avoid psychic pain and 
discomfort, allay or prevent anxiety, resolve conflicts, and generally support and increase 
self-esteem” (Brown & Starkey, 2000, p. 104).  
A large body of research on organizational identity has focused on specific efforts by 
organization members aimed at aligning their perception of what they represent as a 
collective entity and how they would like to be perceived by others outside the 
organization (e.g., Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Gioia et al., 2000). Elsbach and Kramer’s 
(1996) empirical study of how business schools responded to rankings compiled by a 
reputable journal is one such example. According to the authors, members of some 
schools perceived the new ranking system as an attack on their organization’s identity 
because it challenged their understanding of the attributes of the school and also the 
school’s standing relative to competitors. The response in this case was an attempt by the 
school’s members to highlight other categories in which the school did better.  
Ravasi and Shultz (2006) have looked at another internal process aimed at responding to 
environmental threats. They argue and show through a longitudinal dataset that 
organizational culture plays an important role in supporting sensegiving and sensemaking 
that leads members to “re-evaluate aspects of their organizational identity” (p.433). What 
makes this particular study interesting is its identification of a specific form of threat to 
identity. While prior studies had considered external events that challenged members’ 
perceptions of distinctive attributes of their organizations, Ravasi and Shultz (2006) turn 
our attention to environmental events/actions that can cast doubt on the viability of what 
members perceive as a central and distinctive part of their firm. This particular 
explanation of threat is central to our discussion on how perception of identity can predict 
a manager’s response to competitive actions. 
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In the two abovementioned studies, individuals respond to threats to their identity by 
engaging in efforts that preserve it or activities aimed at re-evaluating the current identity. 
In my study of competitive dynamics, an attack by a rival firm that targets elements of 
the business that define the organization can lead to responses due to the same reasons 
mentioned above, but the nature of the response is different. When faced with a 
competitive move aimed at its identity, an organization might resort to defensive actions 
that deflect the attack, or counterattacks in response to those actions.  
Identity can also act as a cognitive filter that influences what organizational members 
notice, and how they interpret environmental stimuli (Dutton et al., 1994; Gioia & 
Thomas, 1996; Livengood & Reger, 2010). In a famous study, Tripsas (2009) discusses 
the case of a digital photography company that failed to identify and exploit opportunities 
in the USB flash drive sector because it did not fit its perceived identity that emphasized 
digital photography. Although a cognitive phenomenon, identity is also reinforced by the 
organizational structures that are implemented based on what the company deems 
important (Nag et al., 2007). Based on what I have discussed, identity guides attention 
towards what is perceived to be central to the organization and naturally, routines and 
structures are developed to maintain that identity. These structures then lead to filtering 
of stimuli that falls outside the identity domain and attention is directed towards stimuli 
that are consistent with identity and the loop continues.  
The only study in the literature looking at how organizational identity influences 
competitive dynamics, is a theoretical article by Livengood and Reger (2010). They argue 
that firms respond to some competitive actions more aggressively and in some instances, 
this is due to a particular subjective factor (i.e. identity) as opposed to the classic 
objective reasoning found in the competitive dynamics literature. As stated by the 
authors, their goal is to look at the antecedents to managerial behavior as opposed to just 
the behaviors themselves. By focusing on the awareness-motivation-capability 
framework, the various propositions in their study explain that firms are more likely to 
invest in businesses inside their identity domain, are more likely to develop a narrower 
range of capabilities outside their identity domain, and are more likely to respond to 
attacks that fall within their identity domain.  
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One major contribution of the Livengood and Reger (2010) article is its focus on identity 
domains as opposed to organizational identity. Identity is how members of an 
organization view themselves, but identity domain is the “competitive arena that best 
captures and reinforces this sense of its identity in the marketplace (p. 49). For example, 
this arena can include products, services, and geographic markets that are perceived to 
define an organizations identity. Identity domains can be products, services, geographic 
areas. The link between identity and what falls within identity domain is clear. Gioia et 
al. (2013)  argue that those features that are “central” to the organization usually manifest 
themselves as values, labels, products, services and routines and form an organization’s 
definition of itself. And as Livengood and Reger (2010) have proposed, identity domain 
clearly casts a net around those parts of the business that help build an organizations 
identity. 
As illustrated by Livengood and Reger (2010), examining the more subjective factors 
involved in explaining action/reactions and their characteristics helps explain why a 
particular firm attacks a particular market or reacts to an attack on one of its markets 
more vigorously than others. These subjective factors encompass a wide range of 
phenomena from individual level factors to issues at the team and society level. 
Livengood and Reger (2010) have looked at organizational identity as one possible 
subjective factor. In their theoretical arguments, they explain why a firm will defend a 
particular market vigorously even in the absence of economic justification. To date, there 
have not been any empirical studies that have tested the role of identity in predicting 
competitive dynamics. Perceptions of organizational identity are an important element of 
managerial cognition and this study aims to address this important gap in the literature. 
 
2.5 External/Internal Orientation 
Managers and organizational decision-makers are frequently faced with a host of stimuli 
from within and outside their organizations. External focus or orientation refers to the 
amount of attention to stimuli that are present outside the firm (Yadav et al., 2007). A 
new technological trend, competition, government regulations, and natural events are 
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examples of environmental stimuli that may attract the attention of decision-makers. But 
inside the organization, various forms of tangible and intangible resources, along with the 
challenges and opportunities they create also compete for the attention of the same 
decision-makers. Internal focus or orientation refers to the amount of attention to these 
stimuli inside the firm (Yadav et al., 2007). Since cognitive resources and attention are 
limited resources (Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1947), an individual at any position in the 
organization cannot attend to everything to the same degree. Managers intentionally or 
automatically choose the target of their attention. But will this lead to an emphasis on 
either external or internal orientation? How is this orientation formed and sustained? The 
review of the literature provides some interesting insights. 
The first stream of research argues that the characteristics of the external environment 
determine if attention is guided away from inside the organization to what is happening 
externally. Cho and Hambrick (2006) argue that an external event such as deregulation 
shifts the attentional focus of a top management team and creates specific cognitive 
orientations. In another study, Garg et al. (2003) argue and show that environmental 
dynamism influences a CEOs attention to external task environment. Dynamism might 
also guide attention towards those internal functions that deal with innovation. D'Aveni 
and MacMillan (1990) propose that after an external crisis hits an organization, managers 
of surviving and successful firms tend to develop an external orientation. Data from 
letters to shareholders was used to measure managerial attention to internal or external 
environments. 
Regardless of what the actual hypotheses are in these studies, it is clear that some 
characteristics of the external environment influence a CEO’s scanning emphasis or locus 
of attention. Although this is an important avenue of research, it is not the focus of this 
dissertation. In fact, to minimize the effect of these external events on my findings, I am 
using a single industry sample so that all firms deal with approximately the same set of 
environmental events. Under these circumstances, I am looking for other factors 
(discussed below) that direct attention to internal or external environments. 
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The second stream of research deals with what goes on inside the firm and how that 
impacts individuals’ attention focus. This body of literature is closely tied to the 
Attention Based View of the firm which argues that structures and communication 
channels inside the organization distribute and regulate the attention of decision-makers 
(Ocasio, 1997). For example, Williams and Mitchell (2004) illustrated that information 
channels within organizations influence their managers’ ability to detect and pursue 
opportunities in the external environment. Their research clearly draws a link between 
organizational characteristics and management’s external orientation. In addition to this 
structural approach, researchers also believe that managers are cognitively oriented 
towards external or internal because of their prior professional and personal experiences 
(Cho & Hambrick, 2006). These individual level differences and the structural variations 
amongst firms within the same industry will create different external/internal orientations 
in managers. 
Researchers have also examined the outcomes associated with an internal or external 
orientation. For example, Rust, Moorman, and Dickson (2002) link focus on elements of 
the external environment with aspiration to increase revenues and eventual higher 
performance. Alternatively, focus on the internal environment and the pursuit of 
efficiency is linked to lower performance. External and internal focus has also been 
linked to innovation. Yadav et al. (2007) show that an increase in external orientation 
amongst a firm’s decision-makers leads to better innovation outcomes. They argue that 
new opportunities often emerge from outside the organization and an external focus 
allows for their identification. Internally focused managers on the other hand are slower 
at detecting new technological opportunities and worse at deploying new products 
(Yadav et al., 2007). Finally, Thomas et al. (1993) show that external scanning 
orientation in the top management of an organization leads to favorable interpretation of 
strategic issues and eventually, higher performance.  
The competitive dynamics literature has not given this cognitive orientation the attention 
it deserves. In one of the earlier studies in the field, Smith et al. (1991) offered arguments 
to show that an external orientation amongst managers of a firm is related to its responses 
to competitive moves. Although the study does offer good theoretical insights, it falls 
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short when it comes to measuring the construct. Although the authors view this as a 
cognitive orientation, they use measures such as the number of VPs a firm has in 
marketing and customer relation roles. It seems that there is a gap between the construct 
and its highly objective measures. My study addresses this gap by looking at this 
cognitive orientation in the context of competition amongst a set of rivals and also 
measuring the construct using a more recent approach in behavioral strategy. 
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Chapter 3: Hypothesis Development 
 
 
The general purpose of this dissertation is to explore why managers sometimes react to 
competition in ways that are not explainable by traditional economic reasoning. To 
achieve this goal, I highlight a set of more subjective factors that influence a manager’s 
decision to respond to competitive moves by rivals. Chen, Su, and Tsai (2007) have 
suggested that theories in psychology and managerial cognition might help shed light on 
the dynamics of this process. While the competitive dynamics literature has widely used 
the awareness-motivation-capability (AMC) framework in examining competitive 
dynamics from an economics-based approach, I follow Livengood and Reger (2010) and 
link concepts from managerial cognition and attention to the same framework in a quest 
to address my research question: How do individual level cognitive factors such as 
mental models and schemas influence the way decision-makers respond to competitive 
actions by rivals? 
Over the years, the AMC model has emerged as a theoretical framework with potential to 
connect a wide range of topics in competition and strategy (Chen & Miller, 2012). 
Applying human psychology to the AMC model helps explain why firms react differently 
to the same competitive move. Because of varying mental models and schemas, managers 
notice and attend to external stimuli in different ways. My focus is on three specific 
aspects of decision-makers’ cognition and their role in determining if a particular 
manager is aware of a move by rivals and motivated to respond to it. Although I briefly 
address the capability aspect of the AMC model, my main focus is on the awareness and 
motivation elements, since they are more closely related to the cognitive orientations 
discussed in this dissertation. 
Chen (1996) formally introduced the AMC framework and linked the awareness and 
motivation elements of the model to market relationships. These market relationships 
have often been measured using objective factors in subsequent studies that have used the 
 
 
51 
 
framework (e.g., Lee et al., 2000; Young, Smith, Grimm, & Simon, 2000). Chen (1996) 
himself has examined market commonality and resource similarity as factors that 
increase awareness and motivation. But the AMC model itself and each of its elements 
have important perceptual components (Chen & Miller, 2012) and interestingly, the 
model has an almost identical counterpart in the managerial cognition literature: 
Individuals only respond to environmental stimuli they are aware of, motivated by, and 
able to react to (Walsh, 1995).  
The “A” or awareness element of the model basically implies that visible attacks have the 
highest probability of inciting retaliation, and attacks on the periphery often go without 
response. Although there are objective ways to determine when an action is visible or on 
the periphery, the mental models and cognitive orientations of decision makers play an 
important role here. Research on organizational attention for example, has pointed to both 
the characteristics of the stimuli (e.g., a rival’s competitive move) and structures, 
procedures and mental models that guide attention. The motivation element has also been 
looked at from an economical and rational perspective. Again, what is important to note 
is that motivation is a function of both cognitive orientations and perceptions. To 
summarize, each individual’s reality is based on what that person perceives and cognition 
determines how something is perceived (Porac et al., 1995). 
Looking at human cognition and perceptions is an interesting avenue of inquiry in 
competitive dynamics because it allows us to get into the black box of competitive 
decision-making and link micro and macro perspectives. In essence, this study examines 
how a manager’s regulatory focus (prevention vs. promotion), perceptions of identity 
domain, and internal/external orientation shape decisions that form competitive strategy 
at the firm level. This is an extension of a tradition initiated by the Carnegie School of 
Thought which has discussed cognitive biases, limitations, and orientations in the context 
of organizational decision-making. Although the focus here is on micro phenomena and 
their link to competitive moves, I explain how macro-level concepts such as 
organizational structures, norms, and identity shape and direct the abovementioned 
cognitive frames and orientations of decision-makers. These factors can be considered as 
the contexts that shape perceptions.  
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The concept of organizational attention plays a very important role in the arguments I 
present in this chapter. Although it is not a variable in my model, it is a key construct that 
sheds light on the mechanisms that link each of the cognitive orientations to competitive 
decisions. The literature on organizational attention explains why and how we 
notice/interpret events and consider a list of viable options that could serve as a response 
to that event (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). In the following sections, I discuss specific 
cognitive orientations that influence the likelihood and speed of response to competitive 
moves. I argue that a competitive action’s salience is an important factor in the 
organizational attention process and in addition to its direct relationship with the nature 
of response it also moderates the hypothesized relationships between cognition and 
action. 
 
3-1 Identity 
As discussed in my review of the literature, identity is the shared understanding amongst 
organizational members on what defines them as an entity (Albert & Whetten, 1985; 
Whetten, 2006). This sense of who they are as a collective also incorporates features, 
elements, competitive arenas, and characteristics that fall within that cognitive definition. 
These features and elements create what is defined as an organization’s identity domain. 
As Livengood and Reger (2010) have explained, identity domain is the top 
management’s consensual understanding of what features represent the organization and 
form its identity. So just like identity itself, identity domain, is an “understanding” and 
therefore a cognitive phenomenon. A domain includes elements such as particular 
products or product features, services, geographic markets, or technologies. Any of these 
elements can be perceived as defining factors in an organization’s identity. For example, 
management at Blackberry (formerly Research in Motion), a top global mobile phone 
producer, has always pointed to data security as a feature that defines their company. For 
Blackberry, data security and technologies related to it are parts of their identity domain. 
It is important to reiterate that what managers perceive as their identity is not necessarily 
connected to any objective economics-based reasoning. Although economic factors might 
form part of the equation, management’s cognitive schemata and perceptions shape, 
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capture, and define identity domains and their elements. This is achieved through a 
process of interpretations and enactments based on prior experiences (history) that define 
shared beliefs (Anteby & Molnár, 2012). These shared beliefs form an identity for each 
firm, which incorporates much of what defines that firm and what is expected of it. 
The discussions I present in this section help create a theoretical link between the 
awareness and motivation elements of the AMC model, and the concept of identity. 
Inspired by a similar line of reasoning by Livengood and Reger (2010), my fundamental 
argument is that managers pay more attention to competitive moves that fall within the 
identity domain of the organization. Anything that falls within this domain is visible and 
salient to decision-makers. The underlying logic for why managers are more aware of 
attacks to their identity domain and are also motivated to respond to them is explained by 
two related mechanisms: 
- Psychological and emotional ties to the identity domain. 
- Perception that what defines the organization is also tightly related to 
performance. 
What is crucial in the first mechanism is that individuals tend to form strong 
psychological ties to the identity of their organization (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996). It 
contains features that members perceive to be central and distinctive in defining who they 
are as a collective entity (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). Their understanding of what 
constitutes organizational identity becomes the lens through which they view the external 
environment and make sense of it. They also feel that identity represents the way others 
outside the organization view them (Gioia et al., 2000). As a result, elements of the 
organization’s activities that fall within the identity domain tend to be more important in 
managers’ minds. Competitive actions that target the identity domain become visible not 
because of the characteristics of the actions themselves, but because specific mental 
models and perceptions categorize them as more significant. The action can take any 
form but because it is targeting an element of the organization’s identity, managers pay 
more attention to it. In other words, the top-down processes of organizational attention 
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(Ocasio, 2011) are triggered in determining the importance of moves that fall within the 
identity domain. 
As previously discussed in my literature review, identity serves as a filter that influences 
what members of an organization notice in the environment and how they interpret 
stimuli (Dutton et al., 1994; Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Livengood & Reger, 2010). Tripsas 
(2009) showed that organizations can overlook environmental events (i.e. opportunities 
and threats) if they fall outside of its perceived identity domain. So attention is directed 
towards what is deemed central to the organization and away from what falls outside that 
definition. Organizations tend to create structures and routines that reinforce their 
perceived identity (Nag et al., 2007). These structures and routines create an added filter 
that directs managerial attention towards activities and events that fall within the identity 
domain.  
In addition to awareness, decision-makers are motivated to react when faced with a threat 
to their identity domain. Individuals that work in organizations with positive identities, 
feel that they acquire positive social identity through association with that organization 
(Dutton et al., 1994). In other words, positive attributes trickle down to all members of 
the organization and a threat to that identity is a threat to an individual’s own social 
identity. To preserve their identity domain and what is perceived to define their 
organizations and themselves, decision-makers are motivated to respond to actions that 
threaten identity or question it. Human beings value their social identities because they 
are linked to self-esteem and self-image. Threats aimed at these highly personal factors 
trigger an emotional response (Brown, 1997). Individuals are motivated to respond to 
identity threats in order to avoid psychic pain and anxiety that result from them (Brown 
& Starkey, 2000).  
Another mechanism linking identity to awareness and motivation is perceptions of a close 
relationship between elements within a firm’s identity domain and its performance. Top 
managers within an organization might believe that what is integral to their identity is the 
most consequential for performance. It is important to emphasize that this is what the top 
management perceives and is not necessarily true. One explanation for this can be that at 
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some point the organization might have been good at doing something and that has 
become a part of their identity. But circumstances change and those elements might not 
have any significant consequences for performance any more. It is often the case that 
management’s perceptions lag the realities of the market when it comes to what 
contributes to organizational performance and identity.  
Marcel et al. (2011) argued that what is related to performance is perceived to be 
strategically important for the organization and those issues that are perceived to be 
strategically important are more likely to be interpreted by decision-makers (Thomas et 
al., 1994). Because managers perceive factors inside the identity domain to be 
consequential for organizational performance, they are more likely to attend to 
competitive actions that target that domain. Paying more attention to these moves leads to 
interpretations and sensemaking that result in a higher likelihood of response. Decision-
makers are also more motivated to respond to moves that target their identity domain 
since they believe there is a link to performance. The fact that decision-makers perceive 
identity domain as a determinant of performance, their subsequent interpretations and 
sensemaking are judged based on this pre-existing conception (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). So 
if managers detect an attack on an aspect of their identity domain, they automatically link 
that to performance outcomes and are motivated to respond. Additionally, the identity 
filter might cause managers to interpret a competitive move as a specific attack on them 
rather than a general competitive action by a rival. This perception of a direct attack will 
motivate managers to respond and minimize the negative outcomes (both emotional and 
objective) associated with it. 
In addition to awareness and motivation, managers might believe they have the necessary 
capability to respond to attacks that target elements within the identity domain. Because 
of what is deemed central to their organization, managers dedicate resources and create 
structures and routines that reinforce those elements of the business (Nag et al., 2007). 
These investments create an understanding that the organization is capable of defending 
its turf when the core is attacked. Livengood and Reger (2010) create a link between the 
awareness and motivation elements of the AMC model with capability by arguing that 
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the presence of those two first elements will result in more resources allocated to parts of 
the business that fall within the identity domain. 
Based on the arguments above, I conclude that competitive actions that target parts of a 
business that are within an organizations identity domain are more likely to be noticed 
and interpreted. In fact, managers will be aware of such moves, motivated to respond, and 
they will perceive that they have the capability to do so. This is due to both psychological 
consequences and perceptions regarding links to organizational performance. Although 
these may be viewed as irrational by an outside observer, it is consistent with the mental 
models and understandings of internal decision-makers. As a result, it seems logical to 
conclude that actions linked to the identity domain are more likely to be met with a 
competitive response by the focal organization. Because attention is a limited resource, if 
the identity domain is receiving a proportionally higher amount of cognitive resources, it 
is safe to assume that competitive attacks targeting the firm outside its identity domain 
will receive less attention. 
H1: Competitive moves that target a firm’s perceived identity 
domain will face a higher likelihood of response. 
A similar line of reasoning is used to argue that managers react to threats against their 
identity domain faster than moves that fall outside it. Under the psychological mechanism 
explained above, a threat against the identity domain is a threat against what the 
organization stands for and, subsequently, what defines individuals within that 
organization. As a move to reinforce that identity and to repel the current and future 
attacks on it, managers respond as quickly as possible to send a signal about their 
determination to defend this identity. I argue that decision-makers are more motivated to 
respond quickly to achieve the maximum results in this regard. A quick response 
reinforces this image and identity in the eyes of external observers. Additionally, if a 
manager perceives a link between factors within the identity domain and performance, 
he/she is motivated to respond as quickly as possible to minimize negative influences on 
performance. Any delays in response can lead to more benefits for the attacking firm 
(Schumpeter, 1934, 1950). 
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Based on these arguments, I conclude that when a competitive action targets parts of a 
business that fall within its identity domain, that organization responds to that action as 
quickly as possible to (a) send a reinforcing message regarding its identity, and (b) 
minimize the perceived negative impact on performance and (c) minimize the 
psychological distress caused by threats to identity. It is important to note that the type of 
action and its intensity can also send an important message. Each type of response (e.g., 
lawsuit, new product, marketing move) requires a different degree of effort and could 
potentially send a different kind of message when the identity is under attack. Having 
acknowledged this, the speed of response regardless of its nature clearly sends the 
message that what is attacked is considered important for the organization. Even if it is a 
less intense response, its speed shows the importance of the issue for the focal 
organization. This easier response can be followed by a more intense and comprehensive 
action, but that is outside the scope of our discussion and this study. 
H2: Competitive moves that target a firm’s perceived identity 
domain will face a quicker response. 
 
3-2 Regulatory Focus 
Regulatory focus is a cognitive orientation toward promotion or prevention (Higgins & 
Silberman, 1998). The theory states that promotion oriented individuals are motivated to 
act in order to achieve a desirable outcome, and prevention oriented individuals act to 
prevent a loss or undesired outcome. In essence, the former is acting to gain pleasure 
while the latter acts to deter pain (Higgins, 1997). These orientations have important 
implications for how individuals make sense of and react to external stimuli. Prevention 
focused individuals are guided by the need for security, usually frame events as threats, 
are interested in keeping the status quo, and view goals as obligations. Promotion focused 
individuals on the other hand are guided by a need for nurturance, have a long term 
perspective, seek development and change, and are eager to achieve maximal goals (Van 
Dijk & Kluger, 2011).  
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Amongst the characteristics and orientations mentioned here and in the review of the 
literature, there are specific elements that directly influence a decision-maker’s awareness 
and motivation regarding environmental stimuli (i.e. competitive actions). The most 
important of these is attitude towards change in the face of environmental circumstances 
and demands. As Hmieleski and Baron (2008) have argued, prevention focused 
individuals tend to view change as a risky endeavor and are more inclined to continue 
with the current course of action. They also find it difficult to reverse course or admit 
previous error. On the other hand, promotion-oriented individuals have greater flexibility 
and are more open to various options in responding to environmental demands. When 
faced with a decision, individuals with a promotion focus consider a wider range of 
alternatives and exhibit more creativity (Spanjol & Tam, 2010).  
Decision-makers make sense of events according to their specific regulatory orientation. 
McMullen et al. (2009) attempted to link managerial attention and regulatory foci by 
proposing that decision-makers who are prevention oriented, see threats as more 
important in their decision-making. Promotion oriented decision-makers are more likely 
to process opportunities or even perceive events as opportunities rather than threats. 
When a decision-maker is faced with competitive moves by rivals, regulatory focus 
determines how that move is cognitively framed and the likelihood of response. Based on 
the arguments above, it is safe to say that because of relational elaboration (Zhu & 
Meyers-Levy, 2007), promotion focused individuals are more likely to view a 
competitive move in a wider context and are also more likely to modify the 
organization’s course of action by engaging in competitive responses. Prevention focused 
individuals perceive competitive moves in isolation (Zhu & Meyers-Levy, 2007) and are 
more inclined to sustain the status quo. 
As a counter-argument, it is possible that because prevention oriented individuals frame 
competitive moves as threats and a possible force that disrupts the status quo, they might 
be more inclined to respond. Their aim is to return the situation to where it was before the 
attack was detected. One might also argue that individuals are more likely to respond to a 
threat rather than an opportunity. But a clear resistance to change in prevention oriented 
individuals and their failure to see the wider implications of a rival’s competitive action 
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clearly outweigh these counter-arguments. Additionally, prevention focused individuals 
are more likely to choose inaction in the face of important decisions  even when there is a 
clear superior alternative (Chernev, 2004). The arguments presented here clearly point to 
the conclusion that when faced with competitive moves by rivals, managers who have a 
dominant prevention orientation are less likely to respond. 
H3: Managers with a higher prevention focus are less likely to 
respond to competitive moves by rivals. 
As a general rule, prevention focused individuals are inclined to prevent change to the 
current strategy and even if there is a change, it is normally manifested as small 
modifications to current processes. Additionally, prevention focused individuals tend to 
be slower in responding to opportunities and threats because of their detail oriented 
approach (Hmieleski & Baron, 2008). When faced with a competitive move by a rival, it 
is argued that prevention-focused decision-makers respond much slower than their 
promotion-focused counterparts because of the time they dedicate to the analysis of all 
possible aspects of an issue and analyzing all that might go wrong. Promotion-focused 
decision-makers have no difficulty altering current strategies in order to capture 
opportunities and capitalize on potential gains in the industry (Hmieleski & Baron, 2008). 
But prevention oriented individuals seek to avoid mistakes, and as a result, they resort to 
careful and lengthy assessment of all possible consequences of any action (De Bock & 
Van Kenhove, 2010). Spanjol and Tam (2010) point to prior studies (e.g., Higgins, 
Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000) and argue that promotion focus 
individuals are quicker in making decisions and pay less attention to details. In contrast, 
prevention oriented individuals emphasize accuracy over speed and take more time to 
fully evaluate the options at hand (to avoid errors).  Some might argue that perceiving a 
move as a threat might create greater urgency and a faster response by prevention 
oriented individuals. But due to the arguments mentioned above and the fact that 
prevention oriented individuals spend more time considering all possible options and the 
risks associated with them, they respond more slowly to prevent mistakes. 
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H4: Managers with a higher prevention focus are slower in 
responding to competitive moves by rivals. 
 
3-3 External/Internal Orientation 
Prior research has shown that certain environmental and organizational factors determine 
if decision-makers develop an internal or external focus (e.g., Cho & Hambrick, 2006; 
Yu et al., 2005). My focus here is on individual level mental models and the 
characteristics of the organization that direct members’ attention towards the external 
environment or the internal workings of the firm. There are two distinct explanations for 
why a manager focuses on internal or external stimuli. One is his/her experiences and 
education that provide certain mental schemata resulting in an external or internal 
orientation. It is safe to assume that this certain aspect, like other mental models are 
relatively stable over time. The second is attention structures and procedural channels 
that guide decision-makers toward a certain orientation (Ocasio, 1997). Although this 
might not be as stable as other cognitive structures, it is reasonable to assume a relative 
amount of stability since these structural elements take time to change. Particularly, 
attention structures that are defined as “the social, economic, and cultural structures that 
govern the allocation of time, effort, and attentional focus of organizational decision-
makers” (Ocasio, 1997, p. 195) are stable and influence behavior in a longer period of 
time. These attention structures are the socially accepted norms within the organization 
that guide various aspects of activities. In addition to the mental structures that are 
instilled in a decision-maker’s mind, these situational factors also help create cognitive 
schemas that influence attention and subsequent decisions.  
In applying the principles of ABV to real option theory, Barnett (2008) argued that 
attentional structures within an organization influence decision-makers’ orientation 
towards either external or internal stimuli. This is then linked to the likelihood of noticing 
options in new markets or existing markets. These two elements (mental models and 
attention structures), taken together, give managers a stable orientation towards either 
external factors outside the organization, or internal elements within. These are 
 
 
61 
 
independent from the characteristics of the environment that more or less change 
attentional patterns for all those involved. For example, Cho and Hambrick (2006) 
showed that when there is a significant environmental shock such as deregulation, 
managers pay more attention to external opportunities. Although this is a useful avenue 
for research on organizational attention, the focus of my arguments are on internal 
attention structures that result in either an external or internal orientation in 
organizational members. 
In applying the AMC model to this particular aspect of managerial cognition, I focus on 
awareness, motivation and capability elements to link external/internal orientation to the 
characteristics of response to competitive moves. Managers with an external orientation 
spend more of their time scanning the competitive landscape, technological changes, and 
institutional characteristics. They tend to be more oriented towards positioning their 
business in a particular space after considering environmental events such as customer 
demands, competitor actions and changes in technology. Because of this focus on 
external developments, it is logical to argue that these managers are more likely to notice 
competitive moves by their rivals. One other important aspect of organizational attention 
is the identification of issues and answers (Ocasio, 1997). More attention to external 
factors means more resources are dedicated to activities that gather information from the 
environment (Durand, 2003) and this abundance of information allows managers to make 
better sense of competitive moves and have more options in responding to them. To 
summarize, managers with an external orientation are able to notice competitive actions, 
make sense of them, and consider more options for response. 
Externally oriented managers are also more motivated to respond to competitive moves. 
They are likely to assume that the antecedents for their organization’s performance 
mostly lie in the external environment. This is in line with the strategizing process often 
discussed in I/O economics and the strategic positioning school of thought (e.g., Porter, 
1980). For these decision-makers, how the firm is positioned in the industry and the 
characteristics of the environment such as consumer demands and competitor actions 
determine organizational performance. In this approach, managers are motivated to 
respond to environmental changes because of the apparent link to performance. On the 
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other hand, internally focused individuals focus on resources and processes inside the 
organization as the factors that influence performance and are therefore relatively less 
sensitive to every single environmental development.  
Finally, prior research offers insights that help establish a link between external 
orientation and capability to respond when faced with competitive actions. Alderich 
(1979) argues that managers with an external orientation often tend to collect more useful 
information and are thus more confident in their ability to respond to environmental 
demands. Also, more information allows managers to detect environmental stimuli earlier 
which in turn leads to more confidence and time to think about a possible response 
(Thomas et al., 1993; White, Dittrich, & Lang, 1980). Based on these arguments, it is safe 
to conclude that when faced with a competitive action by a rival, firms that have 
externally oriented decision-makers are more likely to respond. This is not to say that 
internally oriented managers ignore environmental contingencies and changes. But one 
can argue that they are less sensitive to what goes on externally, including moves by 
rivals. 
H5: Organizations whose top management has a higher external 
orientation are more likely to respond to competitive moves by 
rivals. 
In addition to the discussion presented regarding external/internal orientation and its link 
to the likelihood of response, I argue that this cognitive orientation can influence the 
speed of response to environmental stimuli, and competitive moves in particular. For 
externally oriented decision-makers, the link between what goes on in the environment 
and organization performance is very salient. As a result, competitive moves by rivals 
may be seen as impacting the performance of the organization. Internally focused 
individuals may not view the same competitive move as a direct threat to performance 
because of their focus on internal factors. For them, performance relies more on what is 
inside the organization as opposed to external forces. Because of the perception that 
competitive moves impact performance, externally oriented managers are likely to 
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respond more quickly to these actions in order to minimize negative outcomes. There is 
an increasing sense of urgency when the link to performance is more important. 
H6: Organizations whose top management has a higher external 
orientation are quicker to respond to competitive moves by rivals. 
 
3-4 Salience 
The concept of salience discussed here is similar to the construct discussed in the social 
cognition literature (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991). In this stream of research, the salience of 
particular stimuli interacts with current mental models to shape an individual’s attention 
(Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). An event is salient when it has 
properties that make it likely to be noticed by observers despite individual level 
differences (Sutcliffe & Huber, 1998). Salience is what causes some environmental cues 
to draw more attention than others and is an important element in the concept of selective 
attention. Selective attention implies that individuals and organizations will selectively 
attend to certain external stimuli while ignoring other events (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). 
Those events that are considered non-salient are often referred to as weak-cues and have 
been the subject of a growing number of studies in the organizational attention literature 
(e.g., Rerup, 2009). These studies often explore how organizations can attend to weak 
cues that might contain very important and consequential information. It is up to the 
organization to set up processes that make these weak cues more salient to its members. 
There are two processes involved in determining the salience of an event. First is the top-
down process in which the mental models of decision-makers, organizational structures 
and channels, and shared norms and beliefs make some stimuli more salient. The 
cognitive aspect which focuses on mental models and schemata has been addressed 
extensively in this study and is covered by the first six hypotheses. I also discussed how 
organizational norms and structures can induce a particular form of cognitive orientation: 
external/internal focus. Weick’s (1979) notion of enactment also falls within this top 
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down process. He explains that managers construct, rearrange and alter the objective 
meaning of the objective features of their environments.  
Mental models play an important role in enactment and how managers enact various 
events around them determines their salience (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). Research on 
cognition, including cognition in organizations, demonstrates that the level of salience of 
any given social cue is linked to the degree to which it is novel in the context, deviates 
from expectations, or is goal relevant (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Sutcliffe & Huber, 1998). 
This is in line with Ocasio’s (2011) bottom-up approach which emphasizes the 
characteristics of the stimuli in capturing the attention of observers. One of these 
characteristics can be the social salience which is defined as the prominence and 
importance of an event to a particular social context (i.e. industry) (Hoffman & Ocasio, 
2001). Social salience, influences whether an event attracts attention or not. It can be due 
to a significant negative event with consequences for a large number of entities 
(Mitsuhashi, 2012). When a particular event is salient, it is talked about often and 
reflected in the media which create stronger cues for others inside the particular social 
context. The media coverage creates greater awareness through the availability of 
information (Mitsuhashi, 2012). Based on the presented discussion, I argue that an 
external event such as a competitive move by a rival will receive more attention from 
various stakeholders when it is more salient. This salience is the result of the bottom up 
attention process since it is the stimulus itself and not the actor that is making it easier to 
notice. And because what gets noticed is also more likely to get done, I argue that 
managers are more likely to respond to salient competitive moves. Salience also causes 
managers to notice a competitive move much faster than competitive moves that are less 
visible. The sooner a competitive move is noticed, the faster it will be attended to. 
Managers will respond to salient stimuli more quickly than non-salient ones. 
H7a: Higher levels of salience will result in higher likelihood of 
response to competitive moves by rivals. 
H7b: Higher levels of salience will result in quicker response to 
competitive moves by rivals. 
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In addition to the main effect of salience on the likelihood and speed of response, this 
variable also influences the nature of the relationship between my cognitive predictors 
and the dependent variables. Sutcliffe and Huber (1998) have discussed the strength of a 
situation which as they have noted, is very close to the concept of salience in the attention 
and sensemaking literatures. They argue that strong situations have clear meaning and 
lead everyone to construe particular events the same way. On the other hand, weak 
situations are often vague and do not result in uniform expectancies regarding appropriate 
behaviors. In these situations people notice, perceive, and interpret the event based on 
their mental models and cognitive orientations. This has important implications for the 
hypothesized relationships discussed in this study. When a particular competitive action 
becomes socially salient, it is widely talked about in the industry, and is noticed by a 
majority of observers (Bonardi & Keim, 2005) regardless of their individual mental 
models or the structures within their organizations. It is hard to miss an event that is 
covered extensively by the media and higher social salience can also signal that a 
particular competitive move is of high importance and is thus more likely to be perceived 
as consequential for performance. If everyone is talking about it, then it must be 
something important. In ways, the concept is similar to what Gerstner et al. (2013) have 
introduced as audience engagement which is in essence, the degree to which the general 
public is interested in a particular event. So, in this case, a higher salience for the event 
weakens the proposed relationship between cognitive orientations discussed so far in this 
study, and the characteristics of response to competitive moves by rivals.  
I predict that when we have very high levels of salience, managers notice, interpret and 
act on these actions regardless of their cognitive orientations. On the other hand, when we 
have weak salience, the role of individual’s cognitive schemata and/or organizational 
structures and norms become significant again. Attention is selective and it is up to these 
factors to determine which element of the environment becomes salient. So in instances 
when the competitive move is receiving less coverage in the industry and is less “socially 
salient” the influence of cognitive orientations on the characteristics of response to 
competitive moves becomes important again. Put differently, in cases of high salience, 
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the bottom-up processes of attention are at work, while in instances of low salience, the 
top-down processes become prevalent. The following hypotheses summarize this 
discussion: 
H8a: Salience of a competitive move moderates the relationship 
between perceptions of identity and the likelihood of response in 
a way that for more salient events, the relationship is weaker. 
H8b: Salience of a competitive move moderates the relationship 
between perceptions of identity and the speed of response in a 
way that for more salient events, the relationship is weaker. 
H8c: Salience of a competitive move moderates the relationship 
between prevention focus and the likelihood of response in a way 
that for more salient events, the relationship is weaker. 
H8d: Salience of a competitive move moderates the relationship 
between prevention focus and the speed of response in a way that 
for more salient events, the relationship is weaker. 
H8e: Salience of a competitive move moderates the relationship 
between external orientation and the likelihood of response in a 
way that for more salient events, the relationship is weaker. 
H8f: Salience of a competitive move moderates the relationship 
between external orientation and the speed of response in a way 
that for more salient events, the relationship is weaker. 
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Figure ‎3-1 Summary of Hypotheses 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
 
The hypotheses I have developed in this study, link aspects of managerial cognition to the 
likelihood and speed of response to competitive actions. In this chapter, I describe my 
study design aimed at testing the theoretical arguments (hypotheses) developed in chapter 
3. I use data from one specific industry: mobile phone manufacturers that compete in the 
North American market. This definition ensures that we focus on the major global 
companies. This industry is known for its high level of competitiveness which makes it 
an excellent candidate for my study. It has been the focus of prior studies (e.g., Gaba & 
Joseph, 2013), but not in the context of action/response analysis in competitive dynamics. 
An industry with very few players or very few competitive moves would not include 
enough information for a quantitative analysis such as the one employed in this 
dissertation. However, as I mention in the discussion chapter, future studies can look into 
companies in lower-paced industries using qualitative methods and examine more 
nuanced aspects of the process and also develop new theoretical arguments. One more 
reason for choosing to focus on mobile phone manufacturers is the availability of 
publicly available data on the major players and their competitive actions. This industry 
has historically received a lot of attention in the media because its products are used by a 
large percentage of the population and on a daily basis. 
I have collected and examined multi-year data from the beginning of 2006 to October of 
2013. In this timespan, the composition of the industry has remained largely unchanged 
(8 companies) with no player entering or exiting the industry completely. While 
acknowledging the limits of single industry studies, it was necessary to do so in this 
dissertation in order to minimize the effects of confounding factors. Since my goal is to 
measure cognitive orientations, major environmental factors such as a new revolutionary 
technology or change in regulation can have an important impact (Kaplan, 2008). 
Therefore, it is extremely difficult to do a multi-industry study since firms are impacted 
non-uniformly by industry specific events. It is also close to impossible to examine 
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action-response dyads in firms from multiple industries if they are not competing against 
each other. Action-response analysis is only viable in a single industry sample and all 
studies in this body of literature have in fact used single industry data (e.g., Chen & 
Hambrick, 1995; Marcel et al., 2011; Smith et al., 1991). 
Because of the nature of my study, the methodology is rooted in two different streams of 
research with unique approaches to measurement and testing. To measure the dependent 
variables (likelihood of response and speed of response) I use techniques that are 
prevalent in the competitive dynamics literature. I follow the footsteps of established 
scholars (e.g., Marcel et al., 2011; Smith et al., 1991) and employ a methodology that has 
been tested and re-tested over the past two decades. The independent variables on the 
other hand, are measured using a mix of emerging and established techniques in the 
managerial cognition and attention literatures. One major contribution of this dissertation 
is this cross-disciplinary approach which is also reflected in the methodologies used to 
capture the constructs. In this chapter, I  offer a detailed description of my research 
design and methodology. 
 
4-1 Competitive dynamics: Identifying action/response dyads 
To measure my dependent variables, I used a widely cited “structured content analysis” 
methodology introduced by Smith et al. (1991) that captures competitive actions and 
direct responses to those actions. Traditionally, most studies have applied this approach 
to data from the US airline industry (e.g., Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Hambrick et al., 
1996; Lee et al., 2000; Marcel et al., 2011), but there is no reason why it could not be 
extended to other industries that are also competitive in nature. This dissertation 
contributes to the literature by introducing data from an industry that has rarely been 
examined in this context. In this particular procedure, news archives are searched 
systematically using specific search terms to identify competitive actions and responses 
to those actions. Generally, a competitive action is any move that aims to erode a rival’s 
market share or impact its performance in one way or another (Chen & Hambrick, 1995).  
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As discussed in the review of the literature, these action-response dyads can take many 
forms such as the introduction of a new product or feature, change in prices, a new 
alliance, entry into a market, or a lawsuit. Using specific connector words, I searched in 
media sources to identify reports of instances where a firm has responded to an attack. 
Initial attacks are identified by searching back in the media reports to see what the 
original attack looked like (Marcel et al., 2011). It is important to note that not all firms 
have noticed or responded to an attack which is the basis of my arguments in this study. I 
take an additional step beyond what is customary in most studies. Through the analysis of 
the documents and by widening the search with less restrictive terms, I delve deeper to 
identify a larger number of reported responses to an identified attack. Some of these 
responses might have been filtered out in the initial search. 
My sources of data for the purposes of this study are major newspapers and industry 
specific news websites. Following the procedure outlined by Vergne (2012) and Durand 
and Vergne (2014), I conducted a systematic search of Factiva, Proquest, and Lexis Nexis 
databases. Industry specific websites such as cnet.com cover most of the developments in 
the tech sector including those in the mobile and smartphone industries. Major 
international and national newspapers all have a technology expert (or group of experts) 
and offer comprehensive information that is valuable for this study. Following prior 
research (e.g., Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Marcel et al., 2011; Smith et al., 1991) I 
searched the databases for articles containing the names of any of the companies in the 
industry and any number of “connector words”. These connector words help identify 
articles that discuss an event in which a response has occurred for a competitive actions. 
They also reduce the number of articles in the results (from tens of thousands) to a 
manageable amount that can be analyzed. Additionally, the articles also had to include 
the keywords “smartphone” or “mobile”. As previously mentioned, the time frame was 
set to the 2006 to 2013 period.  
Previous studies have used “in response to”, “reacted to”, “under pressure from”, 
“retaliate” and “retaliation” as connector words and I included them in my search 
command. I also added “supplant”, “hit back”, “defend”, “defended”, “battle”, and 
“rival” to the list in order to cast a wider net and increase the chance of capturing a larger 
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number of reported action/responses. In this method, I rely on media reporting of 
competitive moves and the link they report between a response and an attack. The 
connector words help identify these linkages within articles in the media sources. My aim 
was to use a list of connector words that balance accuracy and efficiency so that I have a 
comprehensive search but also a manageable number of results. I manually browsed all 
articles that resulted from the search to identify instances where the media reported a 
response to a competitive move. The initial action was also recorded in this process to 
measure the response lag and also help identify other potential responses. I moved a step 
beyond this to include the action/responses identified in the process in another less 
restrictive search to identify any possible missed responses from other firms. Here, 
because the inclusion of the action restricts the number of results to a smaller number, I 
dropped the connector words from the search to capture responses that may have been 
reported using language that did not include those words. This new search included the 
names of all firms and the identified competitive move to get a list of articles that may 
point to a response by any of the competitors. 
Since I am focusing on smartphone manufacturers that compete in the North American 
market, most of the news sources are national newspaper/websites in Canada and the 
United States. But these firms also engage in competition in a global scale with 
implications for the North American market and to capture data from those moves, I have 
added one major English language newspaper/websites from Europe, Asia, Australia, and 
South America to capture a complete picture. Vergne (2011) and Durand and Vergne 
(2014) have emphasized the importance of using data sources from various regions. 
Table 4-1 lists the media outlets used in this dissertation.  
  
 
 
72 
 
 
Table ‎4-1 Media outlets used for this study 
Media Outlet
1
 Country 
The New York Times United States  
Wall Street Journal United States 
Cnet.com United States 
Business Insider United States 
Bloomberg (Business Week) United States 
Wall Street Journal Asia US/Asia 
International Herald Tribune US/Asia 
The Globe and Mail Canada 
National Post/Financial Post Canada 
Toronto Star Canada 
Financial Times UK 
China Daily China 
The Times of India India 
The Australian Australia 
Business News Americas Latin America 
 
This comprehensive search process resulted in 55 identified initial competitive actions 
and a total of 385 response/non-responses (N=385) to those competitive moves. If one 
firm had two separate responses to a competitive move (a new product and a lawsuit), 
only the first response was considered. The number of times one firm responded to a 
specific competitive action is not relevant to this study. To measure the speed of response 
(response lag), I recorded the date of the initial action and the date of response. Table 4-2 
                                                 
1
 In this study, I used a collection of North American, international and regional news outlets. My 
observation is that the major North American and international outlets capture most of the competitive 
activity and the regional sources added little to the data. These regional sources contain useful local 
information which was not the focus of this study. Also, I added a number of other regional sources on top 
of this list to test if additional action/response dyads are identified but a quick observation showed that the 
results were mostly regional events with very little added value for the study. 
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presents an overview of the types of actions and responses identified along with their 
frequency. 
 
Table ‎4-2 Types of competitive moves and their frequency 
Type of Action Number of attacks Number of responses 
New Product 26 101 
New Feature/Technology 16 51 
New Service 7 20 
Legal Action (lawsuit)
1
 - 2 
Merger/Acquisition/Partnership 2 6 
Market Entry 3 5 
Marketing Action 1 1 
* The table lists the number of competitive actions in each category during the period of study and also the responses to 
competitive moves and the numbers for each type of response. 
 
4-2 Capturing Cognition 
Action/response dyads were identified using a systematic approach. Attention, mental 
structures and schemas, and interpretations on the other hand are all cognitive processes 
that cannot be measured directly. Although advances in technology now allow us to scan 
brain activity, results obtained through these techniques are still quite limited and not 
many studies in management have seriously considered this technique. As a result, 
researchers measure cognition through behavior and verbal communication as indirect 
measurements of what goes on inside an individual’s head (Barr, 1998). This is rooted in 
the notion that analysis of texts can give us a clear understanding of human cognition and 
allow us to make inferences regarding intentions and values (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 
                                                 
1
 There were a very small number of instances where a firm launched a legal action (lawsuit) against a 
rival. But these legal actions are targeted towards one specific firm and that rival will always have a legal 
response. These few legal action/responses were not included since they are targeted and response reflects 
legal obligations rather than competition. Instances where a legal action was used as a response to another 
type of competitive move are included in the data. 
 
 
74 
 
2007; Huff, 1990; Morris, 1994). Although there is obvious room for errors and 
inaccuracies in this approach, prior research has shown this to be an acceptable method in 
measuring cognitive phenomena (Kaplan, 2011).  
In this study, my main goal is to examine the cognitive processes of those individuals that 
influence the strategic actions of the firm. Therefore, it seems logical to focus on the 
firm’s top managers (i.e. CEO) and decision-makers (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). This is not to say that others inside the firm do not have a say 
in major decisions on competitive actions, but such decisions are approved and decided 
largely by the top managers within the firm. In addition to the direct link between CEO 
decisions and competitive actions, there is also an indirect link through the structures and 
rules that are put in place. These structures, processes and rules influence decisions and 
actions by other members of the organization. 
A large number of studies in the upper echelons literature used demographics as a proxy 
measurement for managerial cognition (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). My study on the other hand, draws from the cognition literature and 
examines direct communication material and statements by top managers to measure 
mental schemata and cognitive orientations (e.g., Barr, 1998; Kaplan, 2008). Documents 
such as letters to shareholders and other text have been extensively used in the literature 
to capture decision-makers’ knowledge structures and schemas (e.g., Barr, 1998; Cho & 
Hambrick, 2006; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan, 2008; Marcel et al., 2011; Nadkarni & 
Barr, 2008). Annual reports and in particular, letters to shareholders and 
speeches/presentations to investors outline the performance and activities of the firm in 
the past year and lay out its plans and activities for the future. Prior research has shown 
them to be a rich source for identifying mental models, interpretations, and causal 
statements (Barr, 1998; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan et al., 2003). For example, Barr 
(1998) used ten years of data from letters to shareholders of 6 major pharmaceutical firms 
to form a longitudinal dataset of causal relationships in those documents. These causal 
relationships were subsequently categorized to form cause maps and changes in these 
cause maps over time were attributed to changes in interpretations of external events. 
Finally, to answer the research questions, the author linked changes in interpretations to 
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changes in strategic actions. The abovementioned study is a great example of how official 
documents can be used to capture cognitive phenomena. What is missing in the study 
however is a more detailed discussion on knowledge structures and mental schemas that 
give rise to these interpretations.  
In another study, Kaplan et al. (2003), used 23 years of data on 15 pharmaceutical 
companies in the US and UK in an attempt to link managers’ mental models to strategic 
choice in the face of dynamic and discontinuous events. Using a measure of managerial 
recognition extracted from documents, the authors show that management’s recognition 
of biotechnology advances are related to strategic actions when controlling for other 
factors. What is different in this particular study is that they have a relatively larger 
sample size which made it difficult to develop causal maps. The process for capturing a 
manager’s cognitive causal maps involves time and labor intensive steps. Instead the 
authors used a normalized word count to devise a measure of recognition. Short and 
Palmer (2003) used letters to shareholders to collect and develop data on a CEO’s 
reference points in decision-making. Their study linked organizational size to CEOs’ 
internal or external referents and their sensemaking of organizational performance. 
No one can doubt the prevalence of text analysis in the cognition literature but one 
criticism towards the analysis of these texts has been that these documents are mostly 
written with a tone that pleases stakeholders and may suffer from impression 
management (Barr, 1998; Marcel et al., 2011). In order to address some of these 
concerns, Fiol (1995) compared management’s private (internal documents) and public 
(annual reports) communications and showed that although the results pointed to some 
extent of bias, the overall conclusion was that public documents such as annual reports 
and letters to shareholders are in fact a good measure of managerial beliefs. Although 
much of the public documents are prepared by the communications department in each 
firm, prior researchers have suggested that the top executive is closely involved in writing 
the letter to shareholders and that these letters along with annual reports contain valuable 
information (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Huff, 1990; Kohut & Segars, 1992). This 
concern is less significant in interviews in which the manager is expressing his/her 
opinions more directly. Other studies have also shown that measures obtained from 
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annual reports and text sources are related to other measures of the same construct 
collected through other more direct methods (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). 
There are also strengths associated with the analysis of these documents. For example, 
Kaplan et al. (2003) have noted that because these documents are prepared ex ante, they 
are not susceptible to retrospective bias. This is not the case with most surveys or 
interviews. Researchers have argued that once an individual is asked to reveal their 
thoughts and beliefs, the mental information changes (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). By 
recalling past thoughts and linking them to outcomes that are now available and apparent, 
the described phenomenon becomes distorted. Interviews and surveys also require access 
to respondents which in this case are top managers of very large companies. Official 
statements in the form of letters, speeches or interviews are examples of unobstrusive 
measures that have been shown useful when dealing with less articulate populations who 
might not have the time or interest to take part in experiments or self-report studies 
(Webb & Weick, 1979). 
Another major advantage of these text sources is that they are also directly comparable 
across firms and time (after sufficient normalization). More importantly, D'Aveni and 
MacMillan (1990) have shown that data captured through content analysis are consistent 
with data obtained from other sources. By relying on secondary data, I am able to capture 
aspects of managers’ cognition and decision-making which are extremely difficult (both 
technically and logistically) to capture through surveys or experiments.  
The use of archival sources in measuring CEO cognition has also found its way into the 
psychology literature which is known for its rigour. A study by Peterson, Smith, 
Martorana, and Owens (2003) used data from first-order sources such as biographies and 
interviews to measure CEO’s personality traits. Although I am not dealing with 
personalities in my study, their approach to measurement is similar to mine in capturing 
some of the cognitive orientations that influence decision-making in the context of 
competitive dynamics. Overall, it seems that content analysis techniques that are at the 
intersection of qualitative and quantitative traditions, are becoming more and more 
established in the management literature (Duriau et al., 2007). 
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In my text analysis approach, documents such as letters to shareholders, earnings report 
transcripts and speeches/interviews to a professional audience were analyzed and coded 
to determine a CEO’s internal or external orientation, promotion or prevention focus, and 
perceptions about identity. I examined one text source for each company/year for the 
majority of cases. By using company/year data, I am also able to account for changes in 
CEOs, and managerial cognition is measured by analyzing texts associated with the CEO 
in charge in each particular year. For the rare cases that no document was available for a 
company in one specific year, data from the adjacent year with the same CEO was used. 
From the total of 64 company/years, data was found for 56 cases. For the majority of 
cases (53), letters to shareholders or shareholder/investor report transcripts were used to 
measure the constructs. For the remaining 3 company/years, transcripts from 
comprehensive interviews were used as a source. I controlled for the document type in 
the analysis to make sure the effect of their possible difference is considered when 
discussing the results. 
 When reading the documents, sentences that corresponded to each of these constructs 
were coded accordingly. To establish inter-reliability, a second qualified rater was asked 
to code a sub-sample (just over 10%) of the data. I explained each construct, discussed 
the procedure, and reminded the coder that sentences are the unit of analysis in the coding 
of these texts. I had good inter-rater agreement for external and internal orientation 
(Kappa>0.70) and promotion and prevention focus (Kappa ~ 0.7), but lower for the 
identity construct (Kappa=0.61). After examining the differences and resolving the 
obvious mistakes and unintended errors the agreement coefficients improved slightly. 
Although identity was in the substantial agreement range (0.6<Kappa<0.8) based on 
Landis and Koch (1977)’s categorization, I examined this construct more closely to 
ensure a clear understanding moving forward. Serious cases of disagreement were 
discussed with the second coder and it seems that the main source of confusion was 
rooted in distinguishing and identifying the interaction between identity, identity domain, 
values, and image. Insights from this process were used in the subsequent coding and 
extra care was taken to focus on the more apparent references to identity. Table 4-3 lists 
sample excerpts from the documents for each of the constructs measured in this process. 
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The process of measuring the three cognitive variables includes some important details. 
For regulatory focus, I follow Brockner (1994) in highlighting the role of language and 
symbols in reflecting a manager’s prevention or promotion orientation. As he put it, if the 
rhetoric and verbal communication are focused on ideals, goals, opportunities and 
change, the CEO has a high promotion focus. Conversely, if the manager’s words are 
related to responsibilities, avoidance, stability, preserving the status quo, and vigilance, 
he/she is more likely to have an orientation towards prevention. Based on what was 
presented in the literature review chapter, promotion oriented individuals also tend to 
frame events in terms of goals and gains, while prevention oriented individuals view the 
same events as obligations and losses (Higgins & Silberman, 1998; Shah et al., 1998). I 
also used insights from questionnaire items used by Ouschan et al. (2007) to identify this 
cognitive orientation. Items in their questionnaire summarize many of the aspects 
described for this construct in the literature and were a good added source of information 
for what I should look for in the text. I also shared these insights with the second coder so 
that we had a shared understanding of the concepts. I extracted sentences and excerpts 
within letters to shareholders and speeches/reports to stakeholders that corresponded to 
prevention or promotion focus. The percentage of sentences belonging to each orientation 
was used to create the measure for a CEO’s prevention/promotion focus. 
Internal/external orientation was measured using a similar approach. Previous studies that 
have looked at internal or external orientation tend to fall into three broad categories 
when it comes to measurement. The first group have measured the construct using proxy 
variables. For example, Smith et al. (1991) used the number of vice presidents in 
marketing and customer relations as an indicator for the externality of the firm’s 
orientation. Others like Garg et al. (2003) have used questionnaires to determine the 
degree of a manager’s attention to internal or external environments. The third group 
which this study falls into, analyzes verbal communications to determine the degree of 
external/internal orientation. Yadav et al. (2007) have developed a list of approximately 
20 words for internal and external and have counted them in CEOs’ verbal 
communications to measure internal/external focus. This list includes words such as 
customer, buyer, marketplace, competition, and position as indicators for external 
orientation and words such as organization, director, subsidiary, manager, and employee 
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for internal orientation. Although this is a much faster method to calculate this cognitive 
orientation, it is very limited in its ability to accurately capture a manager’s mental frame. 
Therefore, I use a similar approach to the one I used to measure prevention/promotion 
focus and look at sentences and quotes that point to external phenomena or things that 
happen inside the organization. If the manager is using sentences that emphasize the 
environment, competitors, and positioning of the company, he/she is more likely to have 
an external orientation. On the other hand, sentences that emphasize products, processes, 
development of capabilities such as training of employees, and structure related issues are 
indicators of an internal focus. This is a more accurate (but at the same time more time 
consuming) way to measure this construct. Once again, percentage of the total document 
dedicated to sentences corresponding to an internal or external focus was used to measure 
this cognitive orientation. 
The process involved in identifying a manager’s perception of identity domain and 
linking a particular competitive move to that domain is complex. Researchers have 
measured identity using various methodologies ranging from case study analysis (e.g., 
Dutton & Dukerich, 1991), to quantitative survey tools that ask respondents to rate the 
extent to which their organization possesses a particular identity trait (e.g., Gioia & 
Thomas, 1996) and open-ended qualitative measures (e.g., Brickson, 2005). Each of these 
methods has strengths and weaknesses. For example, the case study analysis approach 
offers extremely rich data due to researchers’ prolonged and close involvement with an 
organization. But these studies usually focus on a single organization and also require a 
lot of time to conduct. Quantitative data on the other hand is easier and quicker to 
conduct but because of pre-determined questions, they might fail to capture all aspects of 
identity (Brickson, 2005). 
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Table ‎4-3 Excerpts from the documents for each of the constructs 
Construct  Sample quote 
External 
Orientation 
 - Even though I've said that the competitive picture in the second 
quarter was relatively easy, it's very, very clear that the competitors 
we do have in the marketplace continue to be there … 
- But I don't think that we are yet clear as to how the dynamic 
between RIM OS, iPhone, Windows Mobile and Android will play out 
in fourth quarter to each OS providers will put behind that. I think 
that that's creating some uncertainty. It will be a very competitive 
marketplace. 
- … the smartphone market has always been competitive. The names 
have been changed. The names of competitors have changed. In the 
beginning, RIM was sort of the very strongest player, because the 
smartphone as you know really got going into the enterprise area. 
And of course, today, our tough competitor from a hardware point of 
view would be Samsung and married to Google on the operating 
system side. 
- Competitors are scrambling to copy our App Store but it’s not as 
easy as it looks … 
- … we know that software developers they're not going to deal real 
well with all these different size products, when they have to redo 
their software, every time a screen size changes. And they're not 
going to deal well with products where they can't put enough 
elements on the screen to build the kind of apps they want to build. 
Internal 
Orientation 
 - We increased R&D investments and created some of our best new 
products and businesses. 
- I think this simply will be more intuitive, more fun and faster and 
definitely can, in my opinion, meet the market best. Now I'm talking 
about Symbian 3 here. 
- Our priorities will include a more focused product portfolio of 
devices and cloud-based experiences, strengthening our brand and 
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improving operational efficiency. 
- We're not just a service company, we run a network, we run services 
and we run devices and we can create formidable integrated 
solutions. 
- We are now in the final stage of the business transformation 
program started in the mid-2008, and are confident on delivering on 
the target promised by the end of 2010 
Promotion 
Focus 
 - We may get buffeted around by the waves a little bit but we will be 
fine and stronger than ever when the water is calm in the future. 
- I think that we'd like to continue to keep our powder dry because we 
do feel that there are one or more strategic opportunities in the 
future. 
- If there are opportunities, we will look. Acquisitions and stake 
investments have been part of [company name]'s strategy for several 
years and we're always open to working with companies that want to 
work with us. 
- reinforced my determination to re-establish our company’s 
dominant place in the global market by bolstering our core 
competencies and achieving greater competitiveness. With your 
continuing support, we will make this happen together. 
- We have the best ecosystem by far, and we’re just going to keep 
augmenting it, and making it better and better and that shows up in 
both our royalty ratings and our customer stat and I feel very good 
about our competitive position. 
- … as well as the interesting opportunities that will surely arise for 
us to evaluate and attain. 
 
Prevention 
Focus 
 - We assure you that we will do so carefully, applying the [company 
name] discipline and conservative approach you are used to. 
- That being said, earlier this year, we outlined a new strategy 
because of our fundamental concerns about the competitiveness of 
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our product portfolio. 
- As we navigate through this downturn, we will continuously access 
our cost structure and take action, so that we maintain the financial 
strength. 
- really we just want to be careful on this, and we don't want to 
overstate the case. 
- however we believe it is prudent to turn our attention to making 
sure that the operations are as streamlined as possible in case of 
further deterioration in the broader economy. 
- we are deliberately careful about where we are going to strengthen 
our positioning not only the portfolio and sometime features and 
sometime regions 
Identity  - We're all about making the best products at aggressive prices … 
- We don’t know how to make a $500 computer that’s not a piece of 
junk, and our DNA will not let us ship that. 
- We do a great deal of work with different treatments of photography 
that we think really sets ourselves apart.  
-…the key element, the design… 
- being a company whose products and services are always unique 
and differentiated 
- And we are investing and reinvigorating our enterprise heritage 
with [product name]. 
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In this study, to identify what managers’ perceive to be their organization’s identity, I 
follow Elsbach and Kramer (1996)’s methodology to systematically analyze their verbal 
communications for evidence pointing to the construct. Following prior studies with a 
cognitive approach to competition (e.g., Anand, Joshi, & O'Leary-Kelley, 2013; 
Livengood & Reger, 2010; Reger & Huff, 1993), I focus on perceptions of organizational 
identity from the perspective of top level managers and not the lower level employees 
within the organization. Based on definitions offered for the construct, I looked for 
specific managerial statements that pointed to an individual’s belief about organizational 
identity. Albert and Whetten (1985) stated that identity defines the sense of who the 
members of that organization perceive themselves to be and is their statement of who 
they are as an entity. To capture this, I looked for evidence within the data for sentences 
that point to this element in instances where the manager is describing the key and 
enduring attributes of the organization. Sentences like “we are known for…”, “... is who 
we are as a company” and “we have always been a ... company”. I was also vigilant for 
words such as “define”, “differentiate”, “represent”, “integral”, “iconic”, and “DNA” that 
can point to elements inside the identity domain. Table 4-4 lists a sample list of identity 
domain elements and a few corresponding excerpts from the content. 
Following Livengood and Reger (2010)’s definition of identity domain, I looked for 
instances where the manager pointed to products or services as a key element of the 
company’s identity. Sentences like “product A tells the world who we are” or “People 
like us because of product B”, or references to iconic products or services offer insights 
into what people in an organization perceive as features that define who they are. For the 
final measure of identity, I look for instances were a manager is discussing a major threat 
to the organization. Dutton and Dukerich (1991) have argued that environmental or 
internal issues that receive the most amount of attention are those that are linked to an 
organization’s identity. Based on this notion, when a manager focuses on a particular 
threat to the organization, it could be that it is targeting the organization’s identity or 
elements within its identity domain. 
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Table ‎4-4 Sample identity domain elements and sample corresponding content 
Company Identity Domain 
Elements 
Sample content 
Company A - Integrated 
Ecosystem 
- Design 
- Premium products 
“Our DNA is as a consumer company -- for that 
individual customer who's voting thumbs up or 
thumbs down. That's who we think about. And we 
think that our job is to take responsibility for the 
complete user experience.” 
“We want to make great products, and that’s what 
we’re about.” 
 
Company B -Security 
- Focus on 
Enterprise 
“… we are investing and reinvigorating our 
enterprise heritage with [product name], where we 
plan to bring control to IT managers with strong, 
secure, multi-device management solutions.” 
“… bringing security, control and a great user 
experience [company name] is known for, including 
real-time push data, industry-leading security and 
back-end integration.” 
 
Company C - Product Design 
- Premium products 
“[company name] upholds a consumer-focused 
design philosophy” 
“Innovation is encoded into [company name]'s 
corporate DNA 
the company's uncompromising commitment to and 
passion for innovation” 
“… highlight [company name]'s success in 
bridging multiple disciplines to deliver aesthetic 
designs and innovation” 
 
Company D - Design 
- Premium Products 
“being a company whose products and services are 
always unique and differentiated” 
“… global leadership in creating stylish products 
consumers clamor to own.” 
 “… a brand consumers are passionate about and 
willing to pay a premium for.” 
 
Company E - specific product 
line 
- Mass market 
“[product name], which marked the reintroduction 
of an iconic brand” 
“… We think a big mission for us … [is] 
empowering everybody and not leaving anyone out, 
for us is driving affordability and driving the 
mobile internet for much lower price points, and 
making it much more affordable for people.” 
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Company Identity Domain 
Elements 
Sample content 
Company F - Photography 
- Mass market 
- Location services  
“We do a great deal of work with different 
treatments of photography that we think really set 
ourselves apart…” 
“…our unique capability to bring the benefits of 
smartphones to the mass market globally” 
(also, emphasis on the “next billion” initiative) 
 
Company G - Premium 
Differentiated 
Products 
- Innovation 
 “…innovation that inspires the world and shapes 
new futures” 
“… differentiated premium product lines” 
 “We are elevating our status as a premium brand” 
(Repeated emphasis on premium products and 
innovation) 
 
Company H - Entertainment 
including music, 
games, video 
- Innovation 
“delivering in our promise to make it a most 
entertaining Smartphone” 
“…exceed their expectations and create some of the 
most iconic products and content of all time” 
“We must return to the core of [company name]’s 
promise to the consumer, great products, innovative 
service and applications, great design, and being 
one step in front of the consumer knowing what the 
consumer wants even before they do.” 
(emphasis on iconic brands such as Walkman, 
Playstation and Cybershot) 
 
 
After identifying the identity domain for each of the companies in my sample, I drew 
connections between competitive actions and elements within this domain. Through this 
process, it was determined if a competitive action targeted part of the business that is part 
of its perceived identity. Although I acknowledge that an organization’s identity may 
change over time, I have assumed it has remained constant for the time period examined 
in this study. Unlike the other two cognitive orientations which were measured on a 
company/year basis, identity was measured for the duration of the whole period. I did this 
mostly due to data restrictions but it is also rooted in arguments in the identity literature 
that view identity as a relatively stable concept.  
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4-3 Measures 
Dependent Variables 
Likelihood of response: Action/response dyads are identified using the detailed 
mythology described in this chapter. I use a binary variable to show the likelihood of 
response to a competitive action. When a firm responded to an action, it was coded as “1” 
and if a competitive action was left without a response, it was coded as “0”. Since this is 
a binary variable, a logistic regression is used to analyze the hypotheses related to the 
likelihood of response. 
Speed of Response: Speed of response is a continuous variable measuring the weeks after 
the initial action is reported by the media until the response is recorded. As previously 
discussed, when a response was detected in an article, I looked back to identify the initial 
attack and when it occurred. Naturally, this variable only measures the speed of response 
when a response has actually occurred. The dataset for this dependent variable is a subset 
of the original data. 
 
Independent Variables 
Salience: In this study, salience was measured using the amount of coverage a particular 
competitive move receives in the media. As discussed previously, if a competitive action 
received widespread attention in the industry it should become more salient for observers, 
including managers of other firms. Following an established tradition in management 
research (Kennedy, 2008; Petkova, Rindova, & Gupta, 2012; Pollock, Rindova, & 
Maggitti, 2008), I use the number of articles mentioning the competitive action as a 
measure of media coverage and salience. Search was conducted in the trades journals, 
journals and magazines, and newspapers databases in ABI/INFORMS for the period of 
my study. For example, if a company introduced a new product or a service, the number 
of times this action is covered by these outlets (within a reasonable timeframe) is my 
measure of salience for that particular competitive move. The number of articles ranged 
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from a handful to many hundreds for some cases with a mean of 146 articles. It was clear 
that some competitive actions received considerably more attention compared to others. 
Identity related attack: I described the procedure that I used to draw a connection 
between a particular competitive move and a firm’s identity domain. Using a binary 
classification, if in-fact there is a link, I code it as “1”. On the other hand, if a competitive 
action is targeting part of the business that falls outside the identity domain, it is coded as 
“0”. What is important to note here is that the link between an action and identity is 
drawn by identifying identity domains and competitive actions separately and linking 
them together when they pointed to the same features, characteristics or elements. 
Regulatory focus: A manager’s degree of prevention/promotion focus was measured by 
the percentage of text dedicated to each in the documents. A ratio term is calculated to 
determine the percentage of prevention focused material compared to promotion focused 
content. This shows how dominant one focus is compared to the other. Numbers close to 
one indicate an equal orientation and as the number gets larger, it indicates that a 
manager has a stronger prevention focus. Lower numbers on the other hand point to a 
weaker prevention focus. I used a ratio term here to capture the orientation towards one 
or the other construct. There may be instances where a given CEO could potentially be 
higher on both prevention and promotion compared to another CEO. But what is 
important in this study is that manager’s orientation towards one or the other. So even 
this CEO which is high on both scales has a leaning towards one of these orientations and 
that is important for my study. I will examine this further in the discussion chapter. 
External/Internal Orientation: Similar to the procedure for regulatory focus, external 
and internal focus was measured by percentage of words dedicated to each orientation. 
Again a ratio term is used to compare a manager’s external orientation vs. internal 
orientation with higher numbers pointing to a higher external orientation. Numbers closer 
to one indicate that a manager is not leaning towards any one orientation more than the 
other and lower numbers are an indication of internal orientation. Once again, the ratio 
measure allows me to measure a CEOs leaning towards one or the other orientation even 
if he/she is high on both in absolute terms when compared to another CEO. 
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Control Variables 
I included a number of control variables that have traditionally been used as objective 
predictors in the competitive dynamics literature. These variables are included so that I 
can be confident my results are still valid when controlling for economics-based factors 
previously used in and tested in studies. The first control variable is size. Prior research 
has discussed the effect of organizational size on the nature of competitive actions and 
responses. I have included the size of both the attacker and the responders since both 
have been shown to influence competitive dynamics. I measure size using the number of 
employees (divided by 1000 to get meaningful coefficients) in a company for any given 
year. Performance is also included in the model as a control variable. It is measured by 
ROA in any given year and the value for the prior year (t-1) is used to control for effects 
of performance on subsequent competitive actions. I also included R&D focus in the 
model to control for a company’s emphasis on new technologies and products 
development. This variable is measured using the percentage of R&D expenditure 
compared to total sales for any given year. Finally, I added dummy variables for source 
document type to control for the potential effect it can have on the results. This is a 
categorical variable with three values corresponding to letters to shareholders, report to 
investors, and interviews. 
 
4-4 Validity and Reliability 
When dealing with content analysis in social science research, reliability issues arise due 
to the fact that many words of a text are classified into categories under specific labels in 
order to reduce the vast amount of information (Weber, 1990). This coding can be done 
by a human being or by using a computer algorithm. Due to the subjective nature of the 
process, reliability needs to be addressed in any content analysis research. Following 
Weber’s (1990) recommendations, I adhered to specific guidelines to address stability 
and inter-coder reliability. For stability, I used clear coding rules and definitions 
regarding the measured constructs so that cognitive variations in the same coder do not 
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significantly affect the coding process. I also explained these rules to the second coder to 
achieve consistency. For reliability, I asked a second coder to code a sub-sample (just 
over 10%) of my data. To be reliable, the various coders need to be correlated in the 
categories and labels they identify and produce (Morris, 1994). As previously discussed, 
satisfactory inter-rater reliability was achieved in this study and more importantly, 
insights from the process were used in the subsequent coding. 
External validity and generalizability of the results is another important issue that needs 
attention in any research. The hypotheses developed in this study were tested using data 
from a single industry (i.e. mobile phone manufacturing). Therefore, the extent to which 
these results can be generalized to other industries is limited. But it is important to note 
that in research on competitive dynamics, often there is no choice other than to use a 
single industry. Using data from multiple industries introduces a host of confounding 
factors that are impossible to identify and control for (Smith et al., 1991). Single industry 
studies are frequent in the literature and prior research has for example looked at the 
airline (e.g., Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hambrick et al., 1996), communications technology 
(e.g., Eggers & Kaplan, 2009), and pharmaceutical (e.g., Kaplan et al., 2003) industries 
extensively. I acknowledge that generalizability to other contexts is a limitation of this 
study but my findings nevertheless help our understanding of the way managerial 
cognition influences competitive dynamics. Following other researchers (e.g., Berkowitz 
& Donnerstein, 1982; Rowe et al., 2005), I argue that these results are generalizable to 
theory (as opposed to other populations) and/or across time and are therefore an 
important contribution. Future studies conducted in other industries will contribute to 
building a substantive body of literature in this area.   
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Chapter 5: Analysis and Results 
 
 
The hypotheses I developed in this dissertation link a set cognitive orientations and one 
external characteristic of competitive actions to two different dependent variables (DVs). 
Due to the differences in the nature of these two DVs, I use a dedicated analysis for each 
one with a suitable analysis technique. The first dependent variable is likelihood of 
response which is a binary variable with 1 for an instance of response and 0 for non-
response to a competitive action. The second variable is the speed of response which 
measures the time between an initial attack and the time a focal firm responds to that 
move. This is a continuous variable measured in weeks. Before I discuss the results of the 
two regression analyses, I present the correlation table and descriptive statistics for the 
model variables. These are presented in Table 5-1. As mentioned in the methodology 
chapter of the dissertation, the total number of action-response observations is 385. The 
number is lower only for the lag variable (N=186) since it only captures data for 
instances where a firm has responded to a competitive move by a rival. In essence, the 
analysis with the speed of response DV only considers a subset of our initial sample and 
as will be seen, this has implications for the results. A similar approach has been used in 
previous studies examining the speed of response outcome variable (e.g., Marcel et al., 
2011). The correlation table does not show extremely high correlations between the 
variables in the model. Although there are a few significant correlations in the table, none 
of the correlations are large enough to be a source of major concern for multicollinearity. 
The table also shows the means for each of the variables used in the study.  
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Table ‎5-1 Variable Correlations and Means 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1- Size 64.029 59.91 1           
2- Attacker Size 78.296 77.71 -.092 1          
3- R&D expenditure 6.783 3.10 -0.240** 0.071 1         
4- Performance (t-1) 10.750 14.27 -0.237** -0.131** -0.427** 1        
5- Document DUMMY 1.59 0.600 -0.099 0.208** 0.099 -0.159** 1       
6- Link to identity 0.150 0.35 0.049 0.101* -0.086 0.020 0.053 1      
7- Prevention/promotion Focus 1.188 1.24 0.179** -0.108* 0.128* -0.212** -0.084 0.010 1     
8- External/Internal Orientation 0.372 0.19 -0.072 -0.032 -0.258** 0.115* 0.444** 0.082 -0.214** 1    
9- Salience 146.364 143.19 0.018 0.010 0.042 -0.001 -0.023 0.128* 0.036 -0.057 1   
10- Response 0.48 0.50 0.119* -0.067 0.0001 0.041 0.037 0.212** 0.074 0.150** 0.285** 1  
11- Response Lag 38.94 38.04 -0.104 -0.098 -0.092 0.134 0.044 -0.095 0.020 -0.019 -0.105 -0.018 1 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
N= 385 for all variables except “Response Lag”. A reduced sample size of N=186 considered for that variable.  
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For likelihood of response as a dependent variable, I use a hierarchical logistic regression 
approach to test the study’s hypotheses. This allows for a step-by-step inclusion of 
variables to the model in order to test the significance of the relationships and also the 
marginal explained variation. As a general rule, the base model includes the control 
variables. In the second model, I add the main effects to the equation and in the third 
model I include the moderator variables to test the hypothesized moderation effects. The 
third, fourth and fifth models each include one of the hypothesized interaction effects 
which are included individually. The final model adds all IVs and the moderators all 
together. The complete model also illustrates the overall explained variance by the 
proposed predictors in the equation. Since this is a binary dependent variable, I am 
dealing with logit models that require extra considerations especially when interpreting 
the results (Hoetker, 2007). I follow Hoetker’s (2007) recommendations when running 
and analyzing models with the likelihood of response as my dependent variable. 
For the speed of response, I use hierarchical ordinary least squares regression since the 
dependent variable is continuous. It measures the time lag between the competitive move, 
and the time each competitor responds. This is a relatively simpler model to interpret 
compared to the logit model. For both models, I include the size of the focal firm, size of 
the initiator of the competitive move, R&D expenditure for the firm, and its performance 
in the previous year as controls in the first step of the model. I also include a DUMMY 
variable for document type as discussed in the methodology section. This initial model 
gives me a baseline R
2
. In the second step, the predictors are added to the model to 
determine if they are significant and to examine the added explanatory power of the new 
model. Finally, I add the moderators to test for interaction effects. To protect the results 
from the negative effects of multicollinearity, I centred all the continuous independent 
variables before testing the moderator. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 present the results for the two 
analyses. 
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Table ‎5-2 Results for hierarchical logistic regression with likelihood of response as the DV 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
 
Control Variables 
      
Document DUMMY (1)
a
 0.525* 0.155 0.131 0.155 0.120 0.096 
Document DUMMY (2)
a
 -0.267 -1.043 -1.084 -1.042 -1.205
†
 -1.255
†
 
Size (responder) 0.006** 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.005* 
Size (initial actor) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
R&D expenditure 0.060 0.109* 0.97* 0.109* 0.111* 0.096* 
Performance (t-1) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.10 0.010 
Predictors       
Identity link  1.151** 1.093** 1.151** 1.209** 1.136** 
Prevention/promotion  0.128 0.132 0.129 0.129 0.141 
External/Internal  2.573** 2.567** 2.571** 3.138** 3.148** 
Salience  0.004** 0.005** 0.004** 0.005** 0.006** 
Moderators       
Identity link x salience   -0.003   -0.003 
Prevention/promotion x 
salience 
   0.0001  0.0001 
External/Internal x 
salience 
    0.015** 0.017** 
       
 N=385 N=385 N=385 N=385 N=385 N=385 
Cox & Snell R square 0.044 0.181 0.185 0.181 0.198 0.202 
† p < 0.10 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
a 
Categorical variable for document type has three values. Overall DUMMY variable not significant and 
pairwise comparison between values presented here. 
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Table ‎5-3 Result for hierarchical OLS regression with response lag as DV 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Control Variables       
Document DUMMY 0.072 0.145 0.151 0.143 0.130 0.134 
Size (responder) -0.103 -0.119 -0.109 -0.119 -0.119 -0.110 
Size (initial actor) -0.108 -0.100 -0.098 -0.104 -0.095 -0.096 
R&D expenditure -0.090 -0.157 -0.145 -0.154 -0.160 -0.148 
Performance (t-1) 0.066 0.062 0.063 0.061 0.058 0.058 
Predictors       
Identity link  -0.101 -0.101 -0.102 -0.086 -0.087 
Prevention/promotion  0.041 0.041 0.048 0.041 0.045 
External/Internal  -0.127 -0.126 -0.124 -0.141 -0.139 
Salience  -0.100 -0.121 -0.100 -0.108 -0.127 
Moderators       
Identity link x salience   0.046   0.041 
Prevention/promotion x 
salience 
   -0.031  -0.014 
External/Internal x 
salience 
    0.103 0.100 
       
 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 
R square 0.042 0.075 0.076 0.076 0.084 0.086 
Adjusted R square 0.015 0.027 0.023 0.023 0.032 0.022 
† p < 0.10 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
Standardized coefficients reported 
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The results of the analyses show mixed support for my hypotheses. In general, it seems 
that the reduced number of cases in the OLS model resulted in a lack of results for the 
hypotheses corresponding to my speed of response dependent variable. The logit model 
on the other hand produced a number of interesting and significant results. My aim was to 
link a set of cognitive orientations to competitive responses and some of the proposed 
relationships are supported. I also hypothesized a link between salience and response in 
addition to a set of moderator effects on the cognitive links. 
The first model in both regression analyses includes the control variables only. As 
previously discussed, most of these controls are objective factors that may influence the 
likelihood and speed of response. The link between the size of the responder and 
likelihood of response was significant in the logit models. Larger organizations have 
more available resources and are therefore more likely to notice and respond to a wider 
variety of actions. The size of the attack initiator was not significantly linked to response, 
although previous studies have argued that firms are less likely to respond to larger, more 
powerful rivals. The link between R&D expenditure and the likelihood of response was 
significant in most of the logit models. Firms that emphasize R&D are more likely to 
have responses ready for a wider variety of attacks. Prior year performance was not 
significant in any of the logit models. Finally, the dummy variable for document type was 
not statistically significant in most of the logit models. Since this is a categorical variable 
in a logistic regression, it is included in the model first as an overall variable and then a 
pairwise comparison of each category with the reference category. The overall dummy 
variable was not significant (not in the table since it has no coefficient), and the pairwise 
dummy variables are also not significant in most cases. The document type control is 
kept in the model to ensure results hold regardless of their effect. Consistent with the 
pattern seen in the OLS analysis for other variables, none of the controls were linked to 
the speed of response. 
In hypothesis 1, I predicted that companies are more likely to respond to competitive 
moves if their top managers perceive that move as a threat to an element of their identity 
domain. For example, if a manager perceives a feature or technology as a central defining 
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element of who they are as an organization, he/she is more likely to respond to that 
competitive move. Results show that this proposed relationship (H1) is supported 
(p<0.01) and the effect of identity link to the likelihood of response is significant. 
Interpreting the coefficient requires additional steps in this logit model. For this binary 
predictor, I determine the probability of a response happening for instances of an identity 
link, over instances with no link to an organization’s identity.  This can be achieved by 
calculating the “exp” of the coefficient. For identity link, the odds ratio is equal to 
exp(1.151) = 3.16. So if an attack is directed at an element of an organization’s identity 
domain, the probability of a response is more than three times versus when there is no 
link. My second hypothesis (H2) described a relationship between link to identity and the 
speed of response. Despite the strong theoretical argument, the relationship was not 
significant. 
The third hypothesis (H3) explored the relationship between managers’ regulatory focus 
and their tendency to respond to competitive moves. Based on my arguments, companies 
with CEOs that have a higher orientation towards prevention focus, are reluctant to act in 
the face of external events and are thus less likely to respond to competitive moves by 
rivals. The relationship was not significant and thus the hypothesis is not supported. 
Based on the results, it seems that a higher orientation towards prevention focus does not 
influence the probability of a response happening. The fourth hypothesis (H4) linking 
regulatory focus to the speed of response also failed to yield significant results. It seems 
that some of the counter arguments I presented in the hypothesis development section 
might also have a role to play when considering regulatory focus and response to 
competitive actions. As I explain in the discussion chapter, these non-significant results 
can also add to our understanding of the relationship between regulatory focus and 
competitive action.  
I also proposed that a manager who has a higher external orientation compared to an 
internal one is more likely to respond to competitive actions (H5). These managers pay 
more attention to the competitive landscape, and also view the source of success to be in 
managing the external environment. This relationship was significant (p<0.01) and thus 
received support in my results. Managers with a higher external orientation are more 
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likely to respond to competitive moves initiated by rivals. Following the previous 
procedure, I use the “exp” mathematical function to calculate the increase in the 
probability of response, for every one unit of increase in a manager’s external orientation 
compared to internal. For this relationship, exp(2.573)=13.10. So for every one unit 
increase in a manager’s external/internal orientation ratio (keep in mind that a unit 
increase in a ratio is a substantial amount), the probability of response is 13 times higher. 
To put this into context, the mean for external/internal variable is 0.37 with a standard 
deviation of 0.19. Variations in this ratio are much smaller than one unit and as a result 
the likelihood change also increases by a much smaller amount than the number 13 
indicated above. My sixth hypothesis (H6) used the same arguments to propose a link 
between external/internal orientation and the speed of response. Managers with a higher 
tendency towards external orientation were predicted to respond quicker to competitive 
moves by rivals. The results of the OLS regression did not support this hypothesis. 
Hypotheses H7a and H7b predicted that a competitive action’s salience is positively 
associated with a higher likelihood and quicker response respectively. These two 
hypotheses link a characteristic of the competitive action itself (as opposed to a viewer’s 
cognitive orientations) to the nature of response. The proposed relationship in H7a is 
significant (p<0.01) and results show that more salient events are associated with a 
higher likelihood of response. For every unit increase in salience, the probability of a 
response is exp(0.004)=1.005 times higher. This number seems low but understandable, 
given the large numbers associated with salience (Mean=146) in the data. Given the large 
variance in the number of articles reporting competitive moves, the increase in likelihood 
of response is also more than the 1.005 multiplier indicated above for most cases. H7b 
proposed that salience also leads to quicker response to competitive moves. The proposed 
relationship was not significant and salience did not influence the speed of response. 
My final set of hypotheses (H8a,b,c,d,e,f) argued that salience moderated the proposed 
relationships between cognitive orientations and likelihood/speed of response. This was 
an attempt to integrate the top-down and bottom-up approaches in the attention literature 
and illustrate that a characteristic of the stimuli (salience) interacts with cognitive factors 
to influence attention and action. In the presence of higher salience, the effect of 
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cognitive factors on competitive response was argued to be weaker. Only one moderating 
effect was significant (p<0.01) and it was in the opposite direction to the one 
hypothesized. Based on the results, salience moderates the relationship between a 
manager’s degree of external orientation and the likelihood of response (H8e). Opposite 
to what was proposed, salience seems to strengthen this relationship such that for higher 
levels of salience, the effect of this cognitive orientation on the likelihood of response is 
stronger. Hoetker (2007) has recommended that researchers observe and evaluate the 
graph for interaction effects in logistic regression since the magnitude and sign of the 
coefficient might be misleading by themselves. To follow that recommendation, I present 
the interaction effect diagram in Figure 5-1. The first figure is for salience at -1 Standard 
deviation, figure two has salience at the mean and the third figure is drawn with salience 
at +1 standard deviation. A few possible explanations are presented in the discussion 
chapter but as evident in the regression table and diagrams, this result is against the 
theoretical arguments for the moderation effect. None of the other proposed moderator 
hypotheses were supported in the results. Table 5-4 offers a complete picture of the 
results obtained from the analysis. 
Finally, it might be fruitful to take a second look at the results of my OLS regression that 
tested hypotheses related to the speed of response variable. Speed was measured using a 
lag variable with a reduced subset of the data that includes cases where a response was 
coded. Higher lag corresponds to lower speed of response and vice versa. Although the 
OLS model did not yield significant results, a quick look at the coefficients reveals that 
most of the directions are correct and in line with my hypotheses. Although we cannot 
draw any conclusions in the absence of significant results, this brief observation might be 
further evidence that the lower number of cases for this model made it difficult to extract 
statistical significance. In the next chapter, I discuss the implications of these results, and 
the contributions to theory and methodology. 
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Table ‎5-4 Summary of results 
Hypothesis Proposed 
Relationship 
Significant? Result 
H1: Action link to identity  
likelihood of response 
+ P<0.01 Supported 
H2: Action link to identity  
speed of response 
+ No Not supported 
H3: Prevention focus  
likelihood of response 
- No Not supported 
H4: Prevention focus  speed of 
response 
- No Not supported 
H5: External orientation  
likelihood of response 
+ P<0.01 Supported 
H6: External orientation  
speed of response 
+ No Not supported 
H7a: Salience  likelihood of 
response 
+ P<0.01 Supported 
H7b: Salience  speed of 
response 
+ No Not supported 
H8a: Salience moderates the 
relationship between identity link 
and likelihood of response 
- No Not supported 
H8b: Salience moderates the 
relationship between identity link 
and speed of response 
- No Not supported 
H8c: Salience moderates the 
relationship between regulatory 
focus and likelihood of  response 
- No Not supported 
H8d: Salience moderates the 
relationship between regulatory 
focus and speed if response 
- No Not Supported 
H8e: Salience moderates the 
relationship between external 
orientation and likelihood of 
response 
- P<0.01 Opposite direction 
H8f: Salience moderates the 
relationship between external 
orientation and speed of 
response 
- No Not supported 
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Figure ‎5-1 Moderator effect in logit model 
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Chapter 6: Discussion, Limitations, and Future Research 
 
 
6-1 Discussion 
Using concepts from two streams of literature, I have endeavored to provide insights on 
an important question in the strategic management literature: Why do competitors 
respond to each other’s competitive actions. Researchers have looked at a wide variety of 
factors such as attacker or responder’s size, resource slack, multimarket commonality, 
intensity or size of the attack, and availability of technology resources amongst others. 
They have attempted to link these characteristics of the actor, responder, or the action 
itself to a variety of competitive outcomes. Within strategy, one body of research 
specifically looks at how factors such as the ones listed above influence a firm’s 
propensity to attack or respond in retaliation to a move by rivals. The competitive 
dynamics literature has for many years looked at the action-response dyad from various 
angles with some very interesting results. But in a recent review of the literature, Chen 
and Miller (2012) look back at what has been achieved and find areas that require further 
inquiry. Specifically, they argue that research has largely overlooked the opportunity to 
integrate the micro and macro perspectives in competitive dynamics. Although this 
dissertation is the product of my passion for cross-disciplinary research, it is encouraging 
to see that it is also answering an invitation to address the more overlooked corners of the 
literature. 
The fact that the competitive dynamics literature has emphasized the role of human 
agency in competitive decisions (Chen & Miller, 2012) makes it even more critical to 
delve deeper into the micro elements of that decision-making process. In fact, one of the 
most important frameworks developed for competitive dynamics argues that to respond 
to competitive actions, decision makers have to be aware of an attack, be motivated to 
respond, and have the necessary capabilities to do so (A-M-C framework)(Chen, 1996; 
Chen et al., 2007). The first two elements of the framework (awareness and motivation) 
are directly influenced by cognitive factors, and one can also draw indirect links to the 
 
 
102 
 
third element (capability). Due to individual differences amongst decision-makers, what 
they are aware of and their motivation to respond can vary from company to company. 
These factors go above and beyond the economics-based objective predictors that the 
literature has covered extensively. This is important since it allows us to get into the 
black box of competitive decision-making. Even when dealing with objective factors that 
influence the various aspects of competitive action or response, it is crucial to know how 
these factors are noticed and interpreted by the individuals that need to decide on 
initiating an attack or response. By looking at cognitive orientations and mental models 
of these decision-makers, I can go a layer beneath the surface to find and test additional 
factors that help explain why and how firms respond to competitive actions. 
To achieve this important goal, I have looked at a set of specific cognitive factors that 
play a role in this decision. My goal was to incorporate aspects of human psychology in 
an attempt to explain strategic actions. As a result, this dissertation also falls within the 
behavioral strategy (Powell et al., 2011) stream. As evident from my study, the 
manager’s role is highlighted as an information processing entity that makes decisions in 
the face of complex signals from the environment (Walsh, 1995). The first cognitive 
phenomenon examined is managers’ perceptions regarding their organization’s identity. I 
argued and found that managers are more likely to respond to competitive moves that 
target their firm’s identity, or elements within their firm’s identity domain. The strong 
support for this hypothesis could indicate that managers pay more attention to moves 
against their firm’s identity. In essence, it acts as a reinforcing filter for incoming 
information and amplifies stimuli that target elements within an organization’s identity 
domain (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). As a result, it is more likely for managers to be aware 
of competitive moves that fall within this domain. 
Although attention and awareness offer a viable mechanism, my results show that 
managers are also more motivated to respond when the identity domain comes under fire. 
The likelihood of response was significantly higher when an attack was aimed at an 
organization’s identity. This could be due to emotional ties with the identity, and the 
negative feelings associated with any attack targeted at it. The results are in line with 
what Elsbach and Kramer (1996) found in their study of how members of business 
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schools reacted to perceived attacks on their identity. The results also offer support for 
some of the arguments presented by Livengood and Reger (2010) in their theoretical 
study of identity and competitive dynamics. Managers might also be more inclined to 
respond if a move is against their organization’s identity because they perceive elements 
of the identity domain to be closely tied to performance. Of course, the identity-
performance link is only a perception and not necessarily an objective reality.  
I also hypothesized that firms respond more quickly to competitive moves targeted at 
their perceived identity domain. The results did not support this predicted relationship. 
Although this could be attributed to a lack of power due to the reduced sample size, there 
are also possible theoretical explanations. One possibility is that although managers will 
eventually respond to competitive moves that target their identity, they might not be 
capable of doing so quickly. So while the awareness and motivation elements of the 
AMC framework are highlighted by identity, the capability element is not as apparent. 
Most of the previous studies in the competitive dynamics literature have looked at the 
airline industry and the competitive moves there are different in nature from those in an 
industry where technology plays an important role. If an airline wants to enter a route, it 
can do so more easily, but if a tech company wants to add a technical feature or acquire 
another company, the process can take time regardless of the motivation. Although a 
counter argument to this is the fact that managers will invest more resources in elements 
that they perceive to be central to their identity (Livengood & Reger, 2010), which could 
mean the ability to respond faster compared to other parts of the business. Additionally, 
managers can develop an initial response that is easier to design and implement and 
follow that with a more advanced and comprehensive response at a later date. But overall, 
it seems that more elements are involved in the speed of response compared to the 
probability of a response happening at all. This lack of significant result is in itself a 
fruitful discovery that paves the way for interesting subsequent theoretical arguments and 
further empirical inquiry. Establishing a link between the link to perceived identity and 
the likelihood of response is also major contribution to the competitive dynamics and 
behavioral strategy literatures. 
 
 
104 
 
The results for my second cognitive predictor were surprising. I had hypothesized that as 
a manager’s orientation towards prevention focus increases, a response becomes less 
probable. This was rooted in the argument that individuals with a higher leaning towards 
prevention focus are reluctant to change and will stick to the status quo. They are also 
more risk averse which also reduces the likelihood of actions. Those who are more tilted 
towards promotion orientation on the other hand see actions as part of a wider context 
and are more willing to respond to capture available opportunities. The results did not 
support my hypothesis and the relationship between prevention focus orientation and the 
likelihood of response was not significant. A possible explanation for this result may be 
found in the counter-arguments I provided in the hypothesis development chapter. It is 
true that managers with a higher prevention focus are reluctant to change the status quo. 
But at the same time, these individuals view events (i.e. competitive actions) as potential 
threats rather than opportunities. One can argue that human beings are more likely to 
respond to a threat and deflect imminent trouble compared to when faced with an 
opportunity. This might create a situation where we have two opposing forces one for 
action and one for inaction working at the same time. If this is true, the non-significant 
result can actually indicate that regulatory focus does not influence the response to 
competitive actions. But the lack of significant results can also be attributed to a number 
of other possible factors. One is that the constructs are difficult to measure and using 
verbal communications cannot capture the full extent of the orientation. The literature in 
psychology has used priming experiments or questionnaires to test this construct but 
studies have pointed to limitations with those particular measures. I discuss this further in 
the limitations section. Another possible explanation could be the sample size. One might 
argue that a larger sample size might have been able to extract significant results. This 
remains speculation at this point. The link between regulatory focus and the speed of 
response also was not significant and the hypothesized relationship did not receive 
support. Again, this could be due to data restrictions and reduced sample size or the 
weaker link between regulatory focus and capability compared to awareness and 
motivation. 
My results also confirmed that managers with a higher external orientation are more 
likely to respond to competitive moves. These managers naturally pay more attention to 
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the external environment and are more likely to notice an event such as a new 
technological feature, acquisition, or product. As I discussed previously, noticing is the 
first step towards possible action. Based on arguments from the attention based view of 
the firm (Ocasio, 1997), attention involves noticing an event, interpreting it, and 
considering a set of alternatives for a response. Managers with an external orientation 
also attribute their success or failure to elements in the external environment and are 
therefore more motivated to respond to those events. Although a few studies in the 
competitive dynamics literature had argued for the importance of this cognitive 
orientation, most had measured it using proxy variables such as the number of executives 
in external focused departments. I incorporated a form of measurement more prevalent in 
the cognition literature to test the effects of this mental phenomenon on strategic action.  
Despite strong theoretical arguments, external orientation was not related to a faster 
speed of response to competitive moves. Once again this could be due to the reduced 
sample size which makes it more difficult to extract significant results if the relationships 
are not very strong. But the lack of support for the hypothesized relationship can also 
have theoretical reasons. Managers with a higher external orientation will notice 
competitive actions better than those with a lower external orientation. They might also 
be more motivated to respond since they view the source of success or failure in the 
external environment. But the link to capability is not as strong as this might cause 
practical issues when they actually decide to respond. So even with that decision, it might 
take considerable time and effort to actually put that to practice. 
Finally, my results showed that one specific characteristic of a competitive action has an 
effect on the likelihood of response. I discussed salience as the amount of attention a 
competitive move received within the industry. This was captured through the media 
coverage for any particular action. This is a factor that is independent from the managers’ 
cognition as the characteristics of the action itself have made it more socially salient in 
the industry. As I will discuss in the next section, including this variable has important 
implications for research on organizational attention. The more salient a competitive 
action, the more likely it was for it to receive a response. I also hypothesized that salience 
moderates the relationship between the cognitive orientations and the likelihood of 
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response. When managers are faced with a highly salient event, they are more likely to 
respond regardless of their cognitive orientations. So in essence, salience negatively 
moderates that relationship and makes it weaker.  
Results showed support for only one of the interaction effects and it was in the opposite 
direction. Salience positively moderated the relationship between the degree of external 
orientation and the likelihood of response such that for higher levels of salience, the 
effect was stronger. The moderation effect in its current direction implies that when 
managers are faced with a highly salient competitive action, those that are more 
externally oriented are even more likely to notice and respond to it compared to those that 
are less externally oriented. Salience is in fact amplifying the relationship between 
external/internal orientation and the likelihood of response, contrary to my theoretical 
arguments. This interaction between a cognitive factor and salience has important 
implications for research on attention. 
 
6-2 Implications for Research 
This study has a number of contributions and implications for both the competitive 
dynamics and organizational attention literatures. Until recently, most of the studies in 
competitive dynamics focused only on the objective economics-based predictors of 
action-response dyads. By focusing on these factors, researchers offered good insights on 
when and how firms respond to moves by rivals and the characteristics of that response. 
While I acknowledge these important contributions, I step beyond the objective factors 
and explore and test the subjective side of human decision making and its impact on 
competitive decisions. So far, only a handful of studies have attempted this (e.g., Marcel 
et al., 2011) and hopefully the growing body of literature will examine and test more 
aspects of cognition and their influence on competitive dynamics. Human decision-
making is a complex process and because of our limited cognitive abilities, we selectively 
notice and interpret events. Our mental models and cognitive orientations help us filter 
and process the vast amount of incoming data from the environment. This process is 
unique to each individual and can create variations in strategic action amongst firms. 
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Difference in competitive response may now be attributed to individual level thinking 
and orientations such as the ones discussed and tested in this study. I contribute to the 
literature by theoretically linking a set of cognitive orientations to the likelihood and 
speed of response and finding results that help our understanding of behavioral strategy. 
The study also contributes to the literature by testing cognitive variables in a way that is 
relatively new to strategy and competitive dynamics. Identity is a heavily studied 
organizational phenomenon and the strategy literature has also seen its fair share of 
research on identity. Studies have looked at how identity influences performance (e.g., 
Voss, Cable, & Voss, 2006), its role in achieving sustained competitive advantage (e.g., 
Fiol, 2001), and how it shapes the relationships with various organizational stakeholders 
(e.g., Brickson, 2005). Many more studies have looked at how identity is formed (e.g., 
Schultz & Hernes, 2013), if and how it changes (e.g., Clark et al., 2010; Gioia et al., 
2013), and the way individual and organizations react when this identity is challenged 
(e.g., Elsbach & Kramer, 1996). Studies have rarely looked at identity in the context of 
competitive dynamics and specifically its role in explaining the nature of response to 
competitive moves by rivals. In one of the very few articles, Livengood and Reger (2010) 
offer theoretical arguments linking identity to the likelihood and the nature of response to 
competitive actions. Additionally, their emphasis on identity domain and the elements 
that fall within it offered good theoretical and methodological insights for my 
dissertation. My study contributes to the literature by testing one of their propositions that 
linked attacks on identity domain to the likelihood of response. This was possible because 
I incorporated methods from the behavioral strategy and cognition literatures into the 
study of competitive dynamics. Future empirical studies can focus on other parts of their 
theoretical paper and explore the role of identity on other aspects of competitive 
dynamics.  
I tested another cognitive orientation that is under-examined in the strategy literature. The 
concept of regulatory focus has been studied extensively in psychology and has bridged 
over to research on organizational behavior and leadership. Organizational scholars have 
looked at the role of regulatory focus on innovation (e.g., Wallace et al., 2013), new 
venture performance and entrepreneurship (e.g., Hmieleski & Baron, 2008), creativity 
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(e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2001), and executive compensation (e.g., Wowak & 
Hambrick, 2010). In an interesting article, McMullen et al. (2009) offer theoretical 
arguments that link a middle managers’ prevention focus to detection of environmental 
cues (threats). This theoretical work is a great attempt at incorporating this concept from 
the psychology literature in explaining decision-making and attention to external cues. 
My study extends this line of inquiry by developing theory on how this construct 
influences (or does not influence) competitive dynamics. I also used a measurement 
method that is useful when access to top CEOs in the form of experiments or detailed 
questionnaires is extremely difficult. Future studies can build on these results and 
incorporate the concept of regulatory focus in additional contexts and circumstances 
where managerial decision making is of interest. It is also important to note that non-
significant results for this hypothesized relationship do not make the study itself 
meaningless. As discussed in the file drawer phenomenon (Rosenthal, 1979), studies with 
non-significant results also add to our understanding. As I discussed, the lack of 
significant result can be due to opposing mechanisms that explain the link between 
regulatory focus and the response variables. It can also be due to moderators that are not 
identified in this study. This finding can help future researchers look into the construct 
more deeply and explore other possible explanations for the relationship between 
regulatory focus and competitive decision-making. 
Out of the three cognitive phenomena examined in this study, external/internal 
orientation has received the most attention in the strategy literature. Researchers have 
looked at the quantity and quality of managers’ attention to the external environment and 
have argued that this orientation influences various organizational outcomes including 
performance (e.g., Garg et al., 2003; Thomas et al., 1993). It has also been examined in 
the competitive dynamics literature by Smith et al. (1991) as a predictor for the nature of 
response to competitive actions. But studies that have used external orientation in this 
context resort to measures such as number of VPs in external roles as an indirect way of 
capturing this cognitive phenomena. My dissertation contributes to the strategy literature 
by using measurement techniques prevalent in the behavioral strategy and cognition 
literatures to gain a more accurate understanding of the extent of a manager’s leaning 
towards external or internal orientation. 
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Finally, this study has implications for the organizational attention literature. Although I 
do not measure attention directly, it is the overarching meta-theory that explains the 
mechanism for many of my hypotheses. Ocasio (2011) has described two distinct 
processes for organizational attention. In one which he labels as the top-down (or schema 
driven) process, mental structures and cognitive orientations of observers influence what 
is attended to and what is ignored. He points to two main meta-theories, managerial 
cognition and institutional theory (institutional logics) as the most used perspectives to 
explore attention in the top-down process. The first three predictors in my dissertation fall 
under the managerial cognition meta-theory and are part of the top-down process of 
attention. How top managers think and their mental models determine if they notice a 
rival’s action and how they interpret and act on it. Ocasio (2011) also describes what he 
labels as the bottom-up in which the characteristics of the environment or the 
events/stimuli influence the attention directed towards them. This process is also 
discussed extensively in the attention based view (ABV) of the firm (Ocasio, 1997). 
To address the bottom-up process of attention, I added the salience variable to test 
whether this characteristic of the action influences the attention it receives which as I 
argued manifests itself in the competitive response. I argued that more salient events are 
more likely to receive a response and the results supported the theoretical arguments. But 
a more interesting insight that came out of the results was the interaction between 
external orientation and salience. Although the direction of the interaction was opposite 
to what was predicted, it is still a step in the right direction in trying to combine the top-
bottom and bottom-up processes. The significant interaction between salience and 
external orientation shows that characteristics of the stimuli influence the relationship 
between cognition and action and a concurrent consideration of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches. A major contribution of this study is the empirical testing of this interaction 
between the two processes. I am now able to show that cognition and salience interact to 
explain strategic decision-making and action. Future studies can delve deeper into the 
role of attention in competitive dynamics by exploring it as part of a wider set of 
cognitive factors in combination with a more diverse set of external factors linked to 
salience. Human agency, cognition, and decision-making are important factors in 
 
 
110 
 
competitive dynamics and organizational attention can help explain many of the linkages 
that explain why and how firms respond to competitive moves.  
 
6-3 Implications for Managers 
This dissertation also has implications for management practice. First, it offers insights 
for companies in developing structures, routines and processes. As I discussed, 
organizational structures and processes are an important contributing factor in activating 
and reinforcing some of these cognitive orientations. This is an important tenet of the 
attention based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997). The fact that many studies in the 
psychology literature use techniques to prime individuals with prevention or promotion 
focus is an indication that they are to some degree dependent on the situation and 
environment. This is of course on top of the natural tendencies that are instilled through 
childhood and life experiences. By knowing the outcomes of promotion or prevention 
focus, companies can design structures and processes that strengthen one or the other. 
This is also true about external or internal orientation and organizations can use structures 
to emphasize one over the other. The results also illustrate the importance of 
organizational identity in the competitive dynamics process, specifically with regard to 
the likelihood of response. Based on the theoretical arguments presented in this 
dissertation and my results, firms are more likely to respond when they feel their 
perceived identity is under attack. This can be a double edged sword depending on 
whether elements of the identity domain are objectively related to performance or just 
perceived to be. Without an actual link to short and long-term performance, the 
organization might end up spending time and resources defending something that has 
nothing to do with performance. 
The findings can also help organizations gain a better understanding of rivals and their 
actions. More importantly, managers might be able to predict a response or lack of 
response based on their knowledge of managers at competing firms. Anticipating the 
likelihood and speed of response is valuable knowledge that can help organizations plan 
and time their competitive moves. Finally, the findings can help organizations in hiring 
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and promotion decisions. By gaining a better understanding of cognitive orientations and 
mental models, they can hire or promote individuals that fit their competitive goals and 
objectives. This is also in line with Eggers and Kaplan (2009)’s argument that managerial 
cognition is a dynamics capability that can influence strategy and action. Hopefully, this 
study helps managers and decision makers gain a better appreciation for the role 
cognition and individual level differences play in competitive dynamics. It is necessary to 
conduct a detailed objective analysis of competition but the role of more subjective 
factors should also be anticipated when contemplating an action or response. 
 
6-4 Limitations and Future Research 
Before discussing the limitations, I would like to highlight a potential avenue for future 
research regarding some of the cognitive variables I used in this study. I conceptualized 
external/internal focus and prevention/promotion focus as cognitive orientations and 
argued that managers lean towards one or the other when the two are compared. As a 
result, I measure these orientations using ratio terms. Using this conceptualization and 
measurement, the manager’s leaning (captured through comparison) towards one 
orientation, and not the absolute number for each orientation has been discussed and 
captured. A manager may potentially be low on both external and internal or high on both 
and have the same ratio since his/her orientation and leaning towards one compared to the 
other was important for my study. This does not mean the absolute number for each focus 
is not important. If a manager can be high on both internal and external or high on both 
promotion and prevention (more difficult) then he/she may act differently than a manager 
who is low on both. An important first step is to theoretically and methodologically 
determine if this is possible and what it means. This will determine if we can have a 
manager that is both promotion focus and prevention focus at the same time (as discussed 
by Lanaj, Chang, and Johnson (2012) and Scholer and Higgins (2008)) or pay a lot of 
attention to both the external and internal environments. Future research can look at these 
cognitive orientations in the absolute terms and also look at how they interact in 
explaining strategic outcomes. 
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Like any other research study, this dissertation has a number of limitations. Some of these 
limitations can form the basis of future research within this body of literature. The first 
limitation in this study is the absence of firm performance in the hypothesized model. 
Although studies in the competitive dynamics literature have shown that the 
characteristics of actions/responses do have performance implications (e.g., Ferrier, 2001; 
Hambrick et al., 1996; Smith et al., 1991), the link to performance is not present in all 
studies in this area. Since a large number of articles in strategic management use some 
measure of performance as the ultimate DV, future studies in competitive dynamics may 
consider looking at this multi-faceted variable in the context of behavioral strategy and 
competitive dynamics. 
The second limitation of this dissertation lies in the fact that only two characteristics of 
competitive response have been discussed and tested. The likelihood and speed of 
response are two very important and widely examined dependent variables in the 
competitive dynamics literature but they do not capture all aspects of a response. Some 
other features such as the nature of response (the specific kind of action), intensity, and 
different combinations of actions are other possible dependent variables. Response 
intensity and type are particularly important since each category of competitive action 
requires a different level of effort, investment or time. The independent variables 
discussed in this dissertation and other potential factors can influence the intensity of a 
response to an attack. For example, if managers believe that a move is against their 
perceived identity, the type and intensity of response may be different compared to when 
the move falls outside their perceived identity domain. I invite researchers to incorporate 
other aspects of competitive actions in future studies to explore the role cognition plays in 
shaping those variables. Additionally, we can move beyond response and explore the role 
of cognitive orientation on initial competitive attacks and their characteristics. 
This dissertation examines three specific cognitive orientations and their role in shaping 
the response to competitive actions. This is by no means an exhaustive list and there are 
numerous other idiosyncratic cognitive factors that may influence competitive dynamics. 
The psychology area looks at a variety of these cognitive orientations and by bringing 
them into the strategy field, there are endless opportunities for cross-disciplinary research 
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in behavioral strategy. Additionally, my study considers the three cognitive orientations 
as independent concepts. It is possible that perceptions of identity, regulatory focus, and 
internal/external orientation may have some degree of influence on each other. This 
requires further theoretical development and future research can explore this in more 
detail and examine hypotheses with this fact in mind.  
The fourth limitation is related to how a response is associated with an initial action. 
Following the accepted procedure in the competitive dynamics literature (e.g., Hambrick 
et al., 1996; Marcel et al., 2011; Smith et al., 1991), I relied on media articles regarding 
the action/response dyad to identify which action is associated with an initial competitive 
move. Most of the original actions were identified by going backwards from the 
response. I also added a step by doing a less restrictive search for other possible 
responses to a specific action by other industry players which might have been missed in 
the original search. This procedure is based on a number of assumptions that might not 
necessarily reflect the reality of the situation and as a result, there might be doubts 
regarding the causal relationship between an action and subsequent response. For 
example, an action which is reported as or might seem to be a response to a specific 
competitive move might in fact be intended to serve another purpose. One can argue that 
it might be a case of simple technological advancement and adaptation which was 
planned regardless of the move by rivals. Although I used some judgement to minimize 
this effect, it still remains a possibility. I acknowledge this limitation but the 
methodology is largely similar to what has been done in prior competitive dynamics 
studies. Future research can look into finding ways to somehow clarify the true motives 
behind the responses and establish with better confidence if the move was in fact a 
response rather than a natural progression of activities. Interviews or questionnaires can 
gather information from industry experts or employees of the companies involved in the 
industry (not necessarily top level managers) and shed more light on this process. 
Additional industry specific sources such as World Cellular Information Service and 
Strategy Analytics SpecTRAX database used by Gaba and Joseph (2013) can also be 
used as additional sources to supplement the data and increase accuracy. 
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The fifth limitation of this study is that I assumed a degree of homogeneity within the 
TMT regarding decisions and perceptions of identity. Although arguments can be made 
for this assumption, there are also arguments against it. It is possible that top decision-
makers have varying views regarding any issue. But in keeping with the assumptions of 
other studies in behavioral strategy, I emphasize the role of the top manager as the 
ultimate decision-maker. Numerous other researchers have analyzed the role of top 
executive cognition and the link to competitive and organizational outcomes. Although 
the CEO might not be directly involved in every single decision, the strong influence is 
present and studies have shown that decision-making can be attributed to the CEO 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Future studies can look into the differences among the 
top management team members’ cognition and how that can influence the process of 
responding to competitive actions by rivals. 
Future research can also look into how managerial cognition at various levels of the 
organization can influence competitive dynamics. For example, Gaba and Joseph (2013) 
have examined both the business level and corporate level aspiration gaps and how they 
influence the rate of new product introduction. Some of the decisions that lead to 
competitive actions might be made or at least initiated at the lower levels of the 
organization. Research can examine cognitive orientations of managers at various levels 
and their role in explaining actions and/or responses. This becomes even more interesting 
when there are differences between the levels and how these differences influence how 
strategic decisions are made. McMullen et al. (2009) have developed a conceptual model 
that looks at how differences in the regulatory focus between middle managers and top 
managers influence threat detection. Empirical studies in this area can deepen our 
understanding of the effects of cognitive orientations at various levels within the 
organization. 
Finally, as mentioned in the section on generalizability, the results of this study can only 
be generalized to theory and/or across time and extending them to other industries can be 
problematic. I used data from the mobile phone manufacturing industry with its own 
unique set of characteristics that might be different to the dynamics of another industry. 
For example, slow moving industries with a very limited number of competitive moves 
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can also provide valuable information regarding the role of cognition in competitive 
dynamics. In these contexts, researchers can seek rich and in-depth data using qualitative 
techniques such as ethnographies to capture many nuances of the process. Results from 
these studies will be an invaluable addition to the behavioral strategy literature. 
Future studies can also focus on developing new methodology and tools to measure 
cognitive orientations. The method used in this dissertation is time consuming and 
becomes extremely difficult when dealing with bigger datasets. In depth interviews are 
another viable option but they require access and effort from the respondents which 
becomes difficult when studying CEOs and senior managers. For example, if a study 
needs to evaluate the cognitive orientation of a few hundred CEOs, both the method used 
in this study and in depth interviews will not be feasible. Recent developments in 
artificial intelligence and sentiment analysis have produced tools that allow detection of 
moods, feelings, and thoughts in verbal communications. Computer programs can now 
scan vast amounts of text and measure emotional, cognitive and personality factors in a 
very short amount of time. There are numerous opportunities for this technology to be 
used in the study of cognition and managerial decision-making. By using intelligent 
search algorithms, researchers can detect and measure a wide variety of cognitive 
orientations in a large number of senior managers. This significantly increases our ability 
to test interesting hypotheses within behavioral strategy and competitive dynamics.  
Certainly something to look forward to. 
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